The recent step by France with respect to the 1915 incidents represents a great victory for the Armenians before 2015, the 100th anniversary of the incidents.

The rising image of France, which kept its promises to the Armenians, may appeal to the leaders of other countries where the Armenian diaspora has been active. Leaders who exerted efforts to attract the support of Armenians in elections have more often than not changed their attitude and stance after the elections; in most cases, they failed to keep the promises they made during their election campaigns. This situation has now been changed.

Yerevan welcomed the French move, as evidenced by joyous demonstrations held around the French Embassy by Armenians and political party representatives. In particular, old ladies hugged the French diplomats and officers there and sobbed; this sends a clear message and signal as to what sort of sensitivities should be held on the matter. Turkey, which failed to appreciate and notice the growing French investments in Armenia following an important visit by Nicolas Sarkozy to Yerevan in October, was shocked by the French move and started new discussions on French policy.

As these discussions now focus on what kind of attitude Turkey should adopt vis-à-vis France, the Armenian side refers to this ironic situation as surprising; it seems Turkey has been ignoring the main points — that is to say, the 1915 and Armenian issues. Armenian experts note that Turkey should develop dialogue with Armenia immediately and recall that they do not understand why Turkey is focusing on potential measures against France.

The Armenian authorities last year set up an international commission for the remembrance and commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the Armenian genocide; the commission has so far engaged in lobbying activities and carried out a number of studies as well as completed scientific research concerning 2015. Likewise, Armenia has intensified its ties with the diaspora; to this end, they held meetings where they decided to generate policies focusing on the link between Armenia, the diaspora and Nagorno-Karabakh.

In fall 2011, at the Pan-Armenian Congress, where a number of Armenians from different countries participated and which focused on the intensification of ties with the diaspora, domestic and international developments were discussed; the congress also discussed several matters on youth, language and education, preparations towards the 100th anniversary of the genocide and improvement of relations with the diaspora.

‘The diaspora should be fed by the homeland’

President Serzh Sarksyan, who said, “Our formulation is clear: We want the maximum of the homeland opportunities for the diaspora and the maximum of the diaspora opportunities for the homeland,” stated the need for the diaspora and the importance attached to it at the Pan-Armenian Congress as follows: “The diaspora and the homeland should ensure their mutual survival. The diaspora should be fed by the homeland in political, cultural, scientific, health and sports terms; and the homeland should also be fed by the diaspora as well.”

The gains of Armenia and the diaspora may of course be linked to the decision of the Jewish lobby in the West to no longer support Turkey. However, this could only have a limited impact based on the political reflex considering the intricate web of relations in the Caucasus, particularly along the Israel-Azerbaijan and Iran axis. In addition, some unexpected developments may take place with regard to the Armenian genocide up until2015. Inthis case, Turkey needs to devise a short-term strategy on 2015 and drop its longstanding traditional and routine policies. This strategy should complement the normalization process with Armenia and focus on existing problems rather than imitating the steps of the diaspora. Turkey should realize that the publication of some books in response to thousands of scholarly accounts on the historical aspect of the problem will not do anything influential; instead, focusing on public diplomacy may alleviate the fever. Considering that it is not possible to train genocide experts in a very short time, it will be appropriate to rely on civilian democracy and the improvement of economic relations.

Institutions which have firsthand ties with Armenia should be supported to create a common bridge in Turkey. This should be considered in reference to additional efforts on educational, economic, cultural and political relations. As part of bilateral educational cooperation, comprehensive programs may be developed to attract students in Turkish studies departments in Armenia and Armenian youngsters who speak the Turkish language. The Yunus Emre Institute has been pursuing a similar strategy in a number of countries.

In order to improve commercial ties with Armenia, the relevant think tanks focusing on economic affairs might be supported to resolve the problems in bilateral commercial relations through joint action. Considering that 70 percent of the Armenian people support this type of action, it becomes apparent that immediate steps should be taken on this matter. In cultural terms, an approach of civilian diplomacy by which both sides would recognize each other should be advanced. The parties and people who have never seen an Armenian or a Turk in their whole life should be brought together. Political relations will represent the final stage of this process, where Turkish foreign policy will secure great achievements in this conflict-torn region.

By approaches that consider the sensitivities and demands of the Armenian side without turning a blind eye to the reality and truth, Turkey may gain a more prestigious place in the eyes of the Armenian people than the one France has gained and facilitate the resolution of common problems. An Armenia which has to buy agricultural devices from Belarus will be able to have the chance of purchasing its needs from Turkey after the resolution of its problems. If reconciliation is desired, increased attention should be paid to the process of normalization.

Mehmet Fatih ÖZTARSU – Today’s Zaman

http://www.todayszaman.com/news-270139-turkey-needs-to-devise-a-2015-strategyby-mehmet-fatih-oztarsu*.html

Editor’s Note: Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Hale Arifagaoglu is a research assistant at the Institute. Bilge Menekse is a former research intern at the Institute.

By Soner Cagaptay, Hale Arifagaoglu and Bilge Menekse – Special to CNN

Over the course of the 20th Century, Turkey’s world became increasingly Eurocentric. The country joined European and broader Western institutions, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), while also moving to become a member to the European Union (EU).

Today, however, the country’s single-minded European trajectory appears to be a thing of the past. Turkey, which has experienced phenomenal economic growth in the past decade, no longer feels content to subsume itself under Europe.

Since 2002, the Turkish economy has more than doubled in size, reaching a magnitude of $1.1 trillion. Gone is the Turkey of yesteryear, a poor country begging to get into the EU.

Enter the new Turkey: A country that feels confident, booming as the world around it suffers from economic meltdown. In the third quarter of 2011, the Turkish economy grew by a record 8.2%, outpacing not only the county’s neighbors, but also all of Europe.

Europe’s economic doldrums coupled with Turkey’s new trans-European vision under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government means that the country’s traditional commercial bonds with Europe are eroding while its trade links with the non-European world flourish. Accordingly, the Turks are increasingly trading with the non-OECD world (see the chart above).

Paralleling this trend, Ankara has pursued a foreign policy that transcends Turkey’s old European focus.

The AKP’s vision of reaching beyond Europe politically is now Turkey’s vision as well. The following graph shows the number of new diplomatic missions Turkey has opened up since the AKP came to power in 2002:

Source: Turkish Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs official website (http://www.mfa.gov.tr). OIC stands for Organization of Islamic Conference.

If Turkey is no longer trying to fit into Europe, then what is it doing? The best way to describe the new Turkey is as a “Eurasian China” – a country that is aggressively trading with the entire world while building connections to distant destinations. The next graph compares direct destinations served from Istanbul by the country’s flagship carrier, Turkish Airlines, in 1999 and 2010:

Source: Turkish Airlines official website (http://www.turkishairlines.com/tr-tr/). MENA stands for the Middle East and North Africa. CIS stands for the Commonwealth of Independent States, including Russia and former Soviet states.

Is the “Eurasian China” model sustainable? This requires the Turkish economy to keep humming along and the country’s politics to remain relatively stable.

There is a foreign policy angle at work here: Turkey is relatively stable at a time when the region is in upheaval. This, in turn, attracts investment from less-stable neighbors like Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Investors are looking for a stable economy. Ultimately, political stability and regional clout are Turkey’s hard cash. Its economic growth and ability to rise as a “Eurasian China” will depend on both.

The views expressed in this article are solely those of Soner Cagaptay, Hale Arifagaoglu and Bilge Menekse.

via Op-chart: Turkey’s changing world – Global Public Square – CNN.com Blogs.

Starting with that last part, NPR’s Adam Cole just recounted the history of coffee prohibition, including 17th-century Ottoman ruler Sultan Murad IV’s habit of walking around Istanbul dressed as a commoner so he could personally decapitate coffee drinkers with his hundred-pound broadsword.

Murad apparently thought coffee would inspire indecent behavior. Other rulers also banned the drink out of fear it would roil the populace.

In 17th-century England, however, wives reportedly complained that coffee sapped their husbands’ ability to be suitably indecent with them.

Flash forward to 21st-century North Dakota, where the Energy & Environmental Research Center at the University of North Dakota is leading a project to turn coffee-processing waste into energy.

The center is working with Vermont-based energy solutions company Wynntryst produce synthetic gas from coffee residues, plastic packaging, paper, cloth or burlap, and plastic cups coming out of Vermont-based Green Mountain Coffee Roasters. Green Mountain sells Keurig individual coffee cups and supplies coffee products to Starbucks and McDonald’s, among others.

The “syngas” would then be used in an internal combustion engine or a fuel cell to produce electricity and heat or be converted to high-value biofuels or chemicals.

“The EERC system has already produced power by gasifying forest residues, railroad tie chips, turkey litter, and other biomass feedstocks and burning the produced syngas in an on-site engine generator,” center Deputy Associate Director for Research Chris Zygarlicke said in a news release. “The coffee industry residues will be similarly tested.”

Based on the outcome of the pilot project, the center plans to propose a full-scale system for use at various Green Mountain sites.

Speaking of beverages that incite people and can be used for power, Edinburgh Napier University’s Biofuel Research Centre just launched Celtic Renewables Ltd, a company intended to commercialize a process for producing biofuel made from whisky by-products.

The “biobutanol” is made from “pot ale,” the liquid from the copper stills, and “draff,” the spent grains. It can be used as a direct replacement for gasoline, or as a blend, without engine modification, and with less emissions, according to the company.

“Scotland’s whisky has a world-wide reputation for excellence and generates huge benefits for our economy,” Fergus Ewing MSP, Scotland’s minister for Energy, Enterprise & Tourism, said in a news release. “It’s fitting, then, that the by-products of this industry are now being used in an area where we have so much promise – sustainable biofuels.”

Visit seattlepi.com’s home page for more Seattle news.

via Coffee no longer grounds for beheading | Seattle’s Big Blog – seattlepi.com.

ISTANBUL — Expatriates living in Turkey scrambled this week to try to fulfill a new requirement that foreign residents register and pay for national health insurance by Tuesday, January 31, or face a fine said to be 886.50 lira, or about $495.

Early reports indicated that an as-yet unspecified level of coverage would cost foreign residents about 2,500 lire per year.

Confused Americans and Britons flooded their consulates in Istanbul with phone calls and e-mails, struggling to learn how to register, or whether they might be exempt if already covered by their home country’s national health plan or a private insurer.

Others went directly to their neighborhood office of the Sosyal Guvenlik Kurumu, or Social Security Institution. The result? Hours-long lines and office workers who either hadn’t heard of the law or gave conflicting instructions on how to comply.

Confused Americans and Britons flooded their consulates with phone calls and e-mails, struggling to learn how to register. Others who tried to register faced hours-long lines and office workers who hadn’t heard of the law or gave conflicting instructions.

Jolee Zola, a retiree from Cambridge, Mass., who is covered by Medicare, the government insurance plan for the elderly in the United States, visited two S.G.K. Offices.

At first, the director “threw the blame for the ignorance of expats on their consulate,” Mrs. Zola said. “He then told us we needed a signed document describing the kind of coverage we have in the States,” and to take it to another office that deals with foreign applications. At the second office, she was told that she needed a signed, notarized and translated letter from the U.S. Consulate testifying to her insurance status in the United States.

Although the S.G.K. employees did not necessarily know the details, Mrs. Zola said, “They really did try to help us.”

In a message to Americans living in Turkey, the American Embassy in Ankara acknowledged that “exactly how this new law applies to U.S. Citizens and the foreign community is difficult to interpret.”

Mrs. Zola then called the consulate’s American Citizens Services office, and was told that the Tuesday deadline was being postponed to Feb. 29 and that the “consulate was negotiating with the Turkish government to try to come up with a clear procedure.” The consulate on Thursday did not confirm the extension.

“I was very relieved when I heard that,” Mrs. Zola said, “because we wouldn’t have to spend the next few days going nuts, getting documents copied, etc., standing in line.”

Could there be a silver lining in all the confusion?

Some expats without health insurance coverage living in Istanbul said they would welcome the chance to sign up for local health insurance, if the Turkish authorities would only clarify — and simplify — the procedure.

Meanwhile, the British Embassy in Ankara posted a statement about what it called “the sudden changes to the Turkish health insurance system.”

The statement said that after the British ambassador and a consular team met with Turkish authorities about the “the substance, cost, lack of clarity and short notice of the change,” British residents in Turkey would be exempt. But that those who had already chosen to join the Turkish system would be allowed to remain in it.

Do you have a mind-boggling expat insurance or tax story to tell? We want to hear it. Do you think it only fair that foreign residents pay into public health insurance funds in their host countries? Or is this just a way to fill state coffers?

via Expats Face Confusing New Law to Buy Insurance in Turkey – NYTimes.com.

WEF’s Istanbul summit will bring together more than 1,000 people from the political, business, civil society and media sectors.

Turkish Minister for European Union (EU) Affairs and Chief Negotiator Egemen Bagis said Saturday that the World Economic Forum (WEF) would host a summit on Europe, the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia in Istanbul between June 4 and 6.

Speaking to reporters in Davos, Bagis said that Istanbul was a bridge connecting the East with West and the North with South.

WEF’s Istanbul summit will bring together more than 1,000 people from the political, business, civil society and media sectors.

Participants in the Istanbul summit will discuss economic growth and humanitarian development.

AA

Semifinal rounds of the contest will be held in Baku on May 22 and May 24, Final will be held on May 26.
TRT’s decision was a surprise for me, too. Maybe they wanted something different than Turkish POP music this year, something alternative. However, the list of Turkey’s representatives included Hande Yener, Atiye, Murat Boz.

It’s too soon to think about choreography or the stage performance for now. We are still focusing on the song that we are going to present. We all have ideas in our minds but it will be fully shaped after the song is finished, he said.
“Our song will have our ethnic instruments, a healthy dosage of POP and a good beat to make people dance,” he said.

The honor and pride of being selected to represent my country is good enough.

“I trust my work,” he said. “I don’t think that anything will go wrong.”
Can Bonomo is Turkish jazz singer of Jewish origin. He was born in Izmir in 1987. He began singing from 8 years old. At the age of 17 he moved to Istanbul. His first performances were heard on the radio during his college career. Later, he began appearing on television.

Today.Az

I am talking about the complicit support given to Muslim countries in the UN who have been on a rampage to make it an international crime to criticize Islam in any way, shape or form.

In December 2011, the United States hosted what is known as the “Istanbul Process Conference” in Washington, DC. This Conference is explicitly committed to a global ban on any verbal or written criticism of any aspect of Islamic Sharia—even if it is an honest assessment. After all, how else will they cram Sharia down the throats of unsuspecting Westerners?

This effort is spear-headed by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation [OIC], an organization of 57 Muslim countries. The OIC has long been pressuring the European Union and the United States to sign on to what amounts to a suicidal scheme, not only for Europeans and Americans, but to all freedom-loving people in the world.

The OIC’s success in their feverish effort to have the UN pass Resolution 16/18 is a modern day marvel. That resolution was adopted at the HRC [Human Rights Commission] in Geneva in March 2011 and it was quietly approved by the 193-member UN General Assembly on December 19th. However, it needs strong Western support to be effectual.

If this is supported by the West, Americans, with their love for the First Amendment, will have to watch as they lose the free exercise of religion and freedom of speech as Islamic Sharia is slowly but surely enforced in the United States just as it is in England today.

What the United States did in hosting the Istanbul Process was unprecedented since the founding of the United Nations. Namely, they gave the OIC political legitimacy in its desire to silence any voice, including the voice of good Muslim scholars, from criticizing Islam or its tenets. Now Europe is chomping at the bit to host the next convention.

Make no mistake about it. What the OIC is aspiring to accomplish both in Europe and in America is to muzzle the few brave politicians and diplomats who are objecting to the Islamic refusal to integrate into both continents. Indeed, they are asking for Muslims and Islam to be given a privileged position.

As a boy attending government schools in Egypt, we were taught openly and unequivocally, by Muslim teachers, that Islam spreads throughout the world by the sword. However, Islamic expansion could also be fueled in other ways—as indeed we see today.

Today, it is being spread by intimidation of the UN, European Union, and United States, particularly the intimidation of some weak and hapless diplomats and politicians. In all of this, they are using billions of petrodollars as a carrot for their silence.

If we do not take action, we won’t even have to wait ten years before the world wakes up to discover that this nightmare is a reality. In this nightmare reality, good people will be dragged before international courts, facing financial and personal ruin for merely speaking the truth about Islam.

Unless courageous politicians who do “get it” are elected very, very soon, freedom as we know it will be a luxury of the past.

via The European Union and the United States Sign a Suicide Pact – Michael Youssef – Townhall Conservative.

By Chemi Shalev

NEW YORK – The owner and publisher of the Atlanta Jewish Times, Andrew Adler, has suggested that Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu consider ordering a Mossad hit team to assassinate U.S. President Barack Obama so that his successor will defend Israel against Iran.

Adler, who has since apologized for his article, listed three options for Israel to counter Iran’s nuclear weapons in an article published in his newspaper last Friday. The first is to launch a pre-emptive strike against Hamas and Hezbollah, the second is to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities and the third is to “give the go-ahead for U.S.-based Mossad agents to take out a president deemed unfriendly to Israel in order for the current vice president to take his place and forcefully dictate that the United States’ policy includes its helping the Jewish state obliterate its enemies.”

U.S. President Barack Obama taking the stage to speak at the 71st General Assembly of the Union for Reform Judaism. Photo by: Reuters

Adler goes on to write: “Yes, you read “three correctly.” Order a hit on a president in order to preserve Israel’s existence. Think about it. If have thought of this Tom-Clancy-type scenario, don’t you think that this almost unfathomable idea has been discussed in Israel’s most inner circles?”

Adler apologized yesterday for the article, saying “I very much regret it; I wish I hadn’t made reference to it at all,” Adler told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency. And in an interview with Gawker.com, Adler denied that he was advocating an assassination of Obama.

The op-ed in Atlanta Jewish Times.

The American Jewish Committee in Atlanta last night issued a harsh condemnation of Adler’s article, saying that his proposals are “shocking beyond belief.”

“While we acknowledge Mr. Adler’s apology, we are flabbergasted that he could ever say such a thing in the first place. How could he even conceive of such a twisted idea?” said Dov Wilker, director of AJC Atlanta. “Mr. Adler surely owes immediate apologies to President Obama, as well as to the State of Israel and his readership, the Atlanta Jewish community.”

By Max Frankel, Smithsonian magazine, October 2002

It was a lovely autumn day 40 years ago this month, a day not unlike September 11, 2001, when Americans realized that the oceans no longer protected us from enemy attack. Those old enough that October 22, 1962 to know the name John F. Kennedy will never forget the fear that swept through homes and cities when the president appeared on television, grave and gray, to proclaim a crisis. Reading a stern ultimatum to the Russians that called them nuclear cheats and liars for placing offensive missiles in Cuba, he also left the impression that his counteractions might any minute provoke a rain of Soviet missiles. The news terrified the public for six days and nights (though less for those of us trained to parse the bellicose words and signals flying urgently between Moscow and Washington). And as Hollywood has demonstrated time and again, the drama of the Cuban missile crisis has the power to instruct, beguile and entertain Americans in every decade.

The 2000 film version, with Kevin Costner playing an absurdly fictionalized role as Kennedy’s aide Kenneth O’Donnell, was called Thirteen Days, referring to the period of public alarm plus the period of frantic, secret debate that preceded it as Kennedy planned a response to the discovery of the nuclear rockets in Cuba. If the moviemakers had bothered with the Soviet and Cuban sides of the crisis, they could have made a vastly better film, reasonably called Thirteen Weeks. And had they examined the calamitous miscalculations on all sides, it might have been titled Thirteen Months.

Most accounts of the crisis concentrate only on the Washington players, led by the glamorous, nervous president and his shrewd younger brother, Robert. A view of Havana would feature the humbling of Fidel Castro, Cuba’s bearded Robin Hood, and his scheming younger brother, Raúl. In Moscow a bombastic Nikita Khrushchev was drowning in sweat as his boldest Cold War maneuver collapsed into retreat. This is a tale about a fateful triangle.

Like the attacks of 9/11, the missile crisis had deep political roots that were unwittingly nourished by our own conduct. Also like 9/11, our failure to imagine the threat beforehand caused us to ignore the few available warnings. Yet the 1962 showdown left us ill prepared for an Osama bin Laden, because our Soviet foes 40 years ago—though we demonized them as evil aggressors—were rational rivals who valued life. We played nuclear poker against them but shared a common interest in the casino’s survival.

As a reporter in Washington I covered the Cuban drama for the New York Times and have studied it faithfully since. Over the years, our knowledge of it has been enhanced by autobiographies written by many participants, by a great deal of scholarship and by nostalgic, on-the-record gatherings of Soviet, American and Cuban officials. We also have had credible reports on the contents of Soviet files and, most recently, verbatim records of crisis deliberations in the Kennedy White House.

In hindsight, I think two common views need correction. It is clear now that Nikita Khrushchev provoked America not from a position of strength, as Kennedy first feared, but from a chronic sense of weakness and frustration. And it is also clear from the historical record that the two superpowers were never as close to nuclear war as they urgently insisted in public.

Calamitous Miscalculations

Khrushchev, the soviet leader, was a gambler who had expected great returns from his radical economic reforms, denunciation of Stalin, release of political prisoners and gradual engagement with the rest of the world. He had visited the United States preaching coexistence and vowing to compete peacefully. But he was under tremendous pressure. The Soviet hold on Eastern Europe, a vital zone of defense against hated Germany, remained tenuous; Khrushchev’s generals were clamoring for more expensive weaponry; his people were rioting to protest food shortages; and China’s Chairman Mao was openly condemning Khrushchev for undermining Communist doctrine and betraying revolutionaries everywhere.

After the launch of Sputnik in 1957 revealed the sophistication of Soviet rockets, Khrushchev acquired the habit of rattling them at his most stubborn problems. Thanks to his missiles, which cost far less than conventional forces, he was hoping to shift money from military budgets into the USSR’s backward food and consumer industries. By aiming medium-range missiles at West Germany, France and Britain, he hoped to force NATO to acknowledge Soviet domination over Eastern Europe. Toward that end, he kept threatening to declare Germany permanently divided and to expel Western garrisons from Berlin, which lay vulnerable in Communist East Germany. By also rattling longrange missiles at the United States, Khrushchev expected finally to be dealt with as an equal superpower.

Although President Eisenhower had not directly challenged the Soviets’ sway over Eastern Europe, he had not yielded to any of Khrushchev’s other ambitions. A new and inexperienced President Kennedy, therefore, struck the Soviet leader as a brighter prospect for intimidation.

Kennedy had arrived at the White House in early 1961 visibly alarmed by Khrushchev’s newest bluster, a promise to give aid and comfort—though not Soviet soldiers—to support “wars of national liberation” in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Then, in April of that year, Kennedy stumbled into the fiasco of Cuba’s Bay of Pigs, the humiliating failure of a CIA-sponsored invasion aimed at overthrowing Fidel Castro. So when Kennedy and the Soviet leader met in Vienna in June 1961, Khrushchev pummeled the American leader with threats to end Western occupation rights in Berlin and then watched with satisfaction when the president acquiesced in the building of the Berlin Wall.

Kennedy’s response to Khrushchev’s taunts was to flex his own missile muscle. During his presidential campaign he had criticized Republicans for tolerating a “missile gap” in Khrushchev’s favor. Now he abandoned that pretense. As both governments knew, the Russians held only 20 or 30 intercontinental missiles, of unreliable design, and were having trouble building more. By contrast, the United States’ missile, bomber and submarine forces could strike 15 times as many Soviet targets. The Kennedy team began to boast not only of this advantage but also to hint that it might, in a crunch, resort to a “first use” of nuclear weapons, leaving Russia unable to strike American targets.

Thus stung in the spring of 1962, Khrushchev came up with a bold idea: plant medium-range missiles in Cuba and thereby put most of the United States under the nuclear gun. Without having to wait a decade for long-range missiles that he could ill afford, the Soviet leader would give Americans a taste of real vulnerability, save money for other things and strengthen his negotiating position.

Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, the Soviet defense minister, embraced the idea and helped sell it to dubious Soviet colleagues. Khrushchev’s old chum and American expert Anastas Mikoyan predicted an unpleasant reaction from Washington and a tough sell in Cuba. But Khrushchev thought he could hide the buildup from Kennedy until the missiles were mounted and armed; he hoped to reveal his new poker hand in November during visits to the United Nations and Havana.

The Castro brothers were desperate for Soviet weaponry to protect them from American invaders, but they didn’t want sealed-off bases under alien control. To overcome their resistance, Khrushchev forgave Cuba’s debts, promised more economic aid and insisted his missiles would help defend the island and support Castro’s dream of inspiring other Latin revolutions.

Castro was not fooled. There were easier ways to deter an invasion; Soviet ground troops in Cuba could serve as a trip wire to bring Moscow into any conflict, or Cuba could be included in Soviet defense agreements. Castro knew he was being used, but agreed to the bases to show “solidarity,” as he put it, with the Communist bloc and to win more aid for his people.

In Washington as in Moscow, domestic politics fueled the drive toward confrontation. Through the summer of 1962, the U.S. Navy had tracked a large flotilla of ships from Soviet ports to Cuba, while the CIA heard confusing reports about sightings of military equipment on the island. Heading into a close Congressional election, Republicans saw a chance to repay Kennedy for his past attacks on their Cuba policy by mocking his tolerance for a Soviet buildup just 90 miles from Florida. But the administration’s intelligence teams detected only nonnuclear “defensive” weapons—MIG fighter planes, torpedo boats and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), which had a range of only 25 miles. Having roundly misread each other, Khrushchev and Kennedy brought this diplomatic stew to a boil.

The Making of a Crisis

Hearing the republican alarms about missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev sent his ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin, to Robert Kennedy with assurances that the Soviets would do nothing provocative before the American election. And when RFK complained that the buildup in Cuba was bad enough, the ambassador insisted—in innocence, it would turn out—that his government would never give another nation control over offensive weapons.

To fend off the Republicans, the Kennedy brothers hurriedly produced a statement saying that if any nation’s forces were to achieve a “significant offensive capability” in Cuba, it would raise the “gravest issues.” In a deceptive riposte, Khrushchev responded that his long-range missiles were so good he had “no need” to send big weapons “to any other country, for instance Cuba.” OK, then, Kennedy countered, if Cuba ever became “an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union,” he would do “whatever must be done” to protect American security.

American analysts concluded that the president’s strong warnings made it highly unlikely that the Soviets would install a missile base in Cuba. After all, they had never placed nuclear weapons outside their own territory, not even in Communist Europe.

That fixed American mind-set caused Kennedy to dismiss reports from spies in Cuba of missiles much larger than “defensive” antiaircraft SAMs. Then a dumb coincidence delayed photoreconnaissance. Because on September 9 the Chinese shot down a U-2 plane photographing their terrain, the White House ordered U-2 pilots over Cuba to steer clear of areas protected by SAM defenses.

Equally ill timed was the marriage of CIA chief John McCone, a Republican and former businessman who was the only Washington official to have reasoned his way into Khrushchev’s mind. Before embarking on his honeymoon at the end of August, McCone had tried to persuade Kennedy that the SAMs in Cuba could have only one purpose: to prevent U-2 spy planes from observing Khrushchev’s probable next step—the installation of mediumrange missiles capable of striking American cities. McCone’s absence meant his suspicions, and insights, were not heard in Washington for most of September.

Once McCone returned, he learned that an intelligence analyst had indeed spotted, in a photograph, suspicious bulldozer patterns in the terrain in western Cuba—patterns resembling the layout of missile bases in Russia. McCone insisted on more aggressive reconnaissance, and finally, on October 14, in the suspect area near San Cristóbal, U-2 cameras 13 miles up snapped remarkably clear pictures of medium-range missile transporters, erectors and launchpads. It was compelling evidence of imminent deployment of nuclear weapons capable of striking Washington, D.C., St. Louis, Dallas. Khrushchev, deeply committed to defying Kennedy’s warnings, was, in fact, installing at least 24 medium-range ballistic missile launchers (MRBMs), plus 16 intermediate- range missiles (IRBMs) that could reach any point in the continental United States except the northwest corner.

Kennedy, in turn, was just as deeply committed to prohibiting such bases. Upon seeing the U-2 photographs the morning of October 16, he first envisioned an air strike to destroy the missiles before they became operational. His more sober second thought was to keep the news a tight secret until he could take counsel and sift his options. Gauntlets thrown, here began the historic “thirteen days.”

The President’s Men Convene

What appears in retrospect to have been a quickly devised and effective American plan of action was actually the product of chaotic, contentious debate among official and unofficial advisers. They functioned as a rump “executive committee of the National Security Council,” soon jargonized as “ExComm,” and often met without Kennedy, to free up the discussion.

The ranking ExCommers were the president and his brother, the attorney general; Dean Rusk, secretary of state; Robert McNamara, secretary of defense; McGeorge Bundy, national security adviser; Douglas Dillon, secretary of the treasury; Gen. Maxwell Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the other chiefs; John McCone of the CIA; and United Nations representative Adlai Stevenson. They all made a show of keeping their public schedules while moving in and out of secret meetings. From Tuesday, October 16, through Sunday, the 21st, they gulped sandwiches for lunch and dinner and kept their own notes in longhand, without secretaries. They shuttled among meeting sites by crowding circus-style into a few cars, to avoid a telltale herd of limousines. They lied to their wives, to subordinates and to the press. For the climactic hours of decision, the president cut short a campaign visit to Chicago, feigning a bad cold and a slight fever.

All this undemocratic secrecy served a policy purpose. The president was afraid that his options could be dangerously reduced if Khrushchev knew he had been found out. Kennedy worried that the Soviet leader might then stake out a preemptive threat to retaliate for any attack on his missiles, either by firing some of them or attacking American forces in Berlin or Turkey. Alerting Congress could have provoked demands for swift military action without allowing time to study the consequences.

The more the ExComm members talked, the less they agreed on a course of action. Every day brought more evidence of Soviet haste. Some of the missiles, the ExComm members speculated, would surely be armed with nuclear warheads within days, and all within weeks.

So what? the president asked provocatively at one point. He had once said a missile was a missile, whether fired from 5,000 or 5 miles away. And Defense Secretary McNamara held throughout the discussion that 40 or 50 more missiles pointed at U.S. targets, while perhaps quadrupling the Soviets’ strike capacity, did nothing to alter our huge strategic advantage. The Joint Chiefs disagreed, insisting that by dramatically increasing America’s sense of vulnerability, the Soviet weapons would greatly limit our choices in any future exchange of threats or fire.

Everyone soon acknowledged that Soviet bases in Cuba were, at the very least, psychologically and politically intolerable. They would embolden Khrushchev’s diplomacy, especially when it came to his designs in Berlin. They would also enhance Castro’s prestige in Latin America and erode Kennedy’s stature at home and abroad. As if the missiles themselves were not challenge enough, Khrushchev’s deception was seen as undermining U.S.-Soviet negotiations.

The president kept posing the issue starkly, insisting there were only two ways to remove the missiles: bargain them out or bomb them out.

Bargaining might entail painful concessions in Berlin or the withdrawal of American missiles from NATO bases in Turkey; though the weapons were technically obsolete, they represented commitment to an ally. Bombing Cuba would surely kill Russians and risk Soviet counterattack against American bases in Florida or Europe. (Our southern coast lacked radar defenses; as General Taylor observed prophetically at the time, “We have everything, except [the capability] to deal with a simple aircraft coming in low.”) In any case, a strike at Cuba was bound to miss some missiles and require a follow-up invasion to seize the island.

Small wonder the advisers changed opinions as often as they changed clothes. For every possible “if,” they conjectured a discouraging “then.” If we withdrew our missiles from Turkey, then the Turks would shout to the world that American guarantees are worthless. If we sent a Polaris missile submarine into Turkish waters to replace the missiles, the Turks would say we always slither out of harm’s way.

What if we warn Khrushchev of a coming air strike? Then he’ll commit to a violent response. And if we don’t warn him? Then he’ll suffer a surprise attack, seize the moral high ground and announce that the United States would rather risk world war than live with the vulnerability that all Europeans have long endured.

Round and round they went. What about a U.S. naval blockade of Soviet weapons coming into Cuba? Well, it would not remove missiles already in place or prevent deliveries by air. A total blockade? That would offend friendly ships but not hurt Cuba for months.

Time grew short. Many Soviet missiles were installed, and the scent of crisis was in the air. At the New York Times, we heard of canceled speeches by the Joint Chiefs and saw officials being summoned away from their own birthday parties. Lights at the Pentagon and State Department blazed at midnight. We clamored for enlightenment, and officials mumbled about trouble in Berlin. Kennedy heard us approaching and asked our bureau chief, James “Scotty” Reston, to call him before we printed anything.

Thursday, October 18, was the day for a double bluff when Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko paid a scheduled visit to the White House. He sparred with the president over Berlin but held tightly to his written-out claim that only “defensive” weapons were going to Cuba. Though angry, Kennedy and Rusk pretended to be fooled.

The president had told ExComm earlier that morning that he discounted the threat of a nuclear attack from Cuba—“unless they’re going to be using them from every place.” He most feared nonnuclear retaliation in Europe, probably in Berlin. But as McNamara put it to the group, firm action was essential to preserve the president’s credibility, to hold the alliance together, to tame Khrushchev for future diplomacy—and by no means least—to protect the administration in domestic American politics.

Most important, ExComm had the benefit of the considered views of Llewellyn “Tommy” Thompson, Jr., the just returned ambassador to Moscow who knew Khrushchev better and longer than any Western diplomat. He thought the Soviet leader intended for his missiles to be discovered—to invigorate his campaign against the West. Thompson felt that Khrushchev might well respect a U.S. weapons blockade and was unlikely to risk a fight in faraway Cuba. While he might strike impetuously at Berlin, that was a gamble he had been reluctant to take for four years.

Returning Saturday from Chicago with his “cold,” Kennedy seemed to buy Thompson’s assessment. He was ready to risk a Berlin crisis because, as he had told the Ex-Comm, “if we do nothing, we’re going to have the problem of Berlin anyway.” A blockade would buy time. They could always ratchet up tougher action if Khrushchev didn’t back down.

Kennedy was plainly haunted, however, by the Bay of Pigs and by his reputation for timidity. So he ended the week’s deliberation by again cross-examining the Joint Chiefs. Would an air strike destroy all the missiles and bombers? Well, 90 percent. And would Russian troops be killed? Yes, for sure. And couldn’t Khrushchev just send more missiles? Yes, we’d have to invade. And wouldn’t invasion provoke countermoves in Europe?

The president decided to avoid violent measures for as long as possible. But he did not want to reveal the tactical reasons for preferring a blockade. He insisted his aides use “the Pearl Harbor explanation” for rejecting an air strike—that Americans do not engage in preemptive surprise attacks—a disingenuous rationale that Robert Kennedy piously planted in histories of the crisis.

Story of a Lifetime

When I learned from his butler that the west German ambassador was fast asleep before midnight Friday, I became certain that the agitation in Washington did not concern Berlin, and so my Times colleagues and I focused on Cuba. And if it was Cuba, given all the recent alarms, that had to mean the discovery of “offensive” missiles. On Sunday, October 21, as promised, Scotty Reston called the White House. When Kennedy came on the line, Scotty asked me to listen on an extension.

“So you know?” Kennedy asked Reston, as I recall it. “And do you know what I’m going to do about it?”

“No, sir, we don’t,” Reston answered, “except we know you promised to act, and we hear you’ve asked for television time tomorrow night.”

“That’s right. I’m going to order a blockade.”

I was tasting a great story when Kennedy dropped the other shoe. If he lost the element of surprise, he went on, Khrushchev could take steps that would deepen the crisis. Would we suppress the news in the national interest?

Reston called a meeting. For reasons patriotic or selfish, I at first resisted granting the president’s request. A blockade is an act of war. Did we have the right to suppress news of a superpower war before Congress or the public had even an inkling of danger?

Reston phoned the president again and explained our concern. Did Kennedy want secrecy until after the shooting had begun?

“Scotty,” the president said, “we’ve taken a whole week to plan our response. I’m going to order a blockade. It’s the least I can do. But we will not immediately attack. You have my word of honor: there will be no bloodshed before I explain this very serious situation to the American people.”

Given the president’s word of honor, I believe to this day that we were right to defer publication by 24 hours. Kennedy’s reasons were persuasive: our disclosure could have led the Soviets to threaten a violent response against the blockade and thus provoke a violent conflict. But I took my name off the fudged story I wrote for Monday’s paper: “Capital’s Crisis Air Hints at Development on Cuba,” which, without mentioning missiles or a blockade, said the president would deliver news of a crisis. Like the Washington Post, which had been similarly importuned by the president, we held back most of what we knew.

Kennedy’s speech that Monday evening, October 22, was the most menacing of any presidential address during the entire Cold War. Although the senate leaders whom he had just briefed deplored his reluctance to attack, Kennedy stressed the danger implicit in the moment:

“[T]his secret, swift, and extraordinary build-up of Communist missiles . . . in violation of Soviet assurances, and in defiance of American and hemispheric policy . . . is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe. . . . Should these offensive military preparations continue . . . further action will be justified. . . . It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.”

Americans certainly did not underrate the gravity of events; families drew close, planned emergency escapes, hoarded food, and hung on every news bulletin. Friendly governments supported the president, but many of their people feared his belligerence, and some marched in protest. In a private letter to Khrushchev, Kennedy vowed to stand firm in Berlin, warning him not to misjudge the “minimum” action the president had taken so far.

The Kremlin’s response encouraged both ExComm and diplomatic observers. While denouncing America’s “piracy” at sea and instructing Soviet agents abroad to fan the fear of war, the Kremlin obviously had no ready plan for counteraction. Berlin was calm; so were our bases in Turkey. Moscow’s government-controlled press pretended that Kennedy had challenged little Cuba rather than the Soviet Union. Khrushchev assented at once when the U.N. Secretary General, U Thant, tried to broker a pause for negotiation, but Kennedy decided to balk. In fact, Washington prepared a blunt notice about how the United States planned to challenge Soviet ships and fire dummy depth charges to force submarines to surface at the blockade line.

More good news came on Wednesday, October 24. The president kept some of his nuclear bombers airborne for the Russians to notice. And suddenly word arrived that Khrushchev had ordered his most vulnerable Cuba-bound ships to stop or turn tail. Recalling a childhood game in his native Georgia, Dean Rusk remarked, “We’re eyeball-to-eyeball, and I think the other fellow just blinked.”

Washington also soon learned that the Soviets had instructed the Cubans not to fire antiaircraft guns except in self-defense, giving American reconnaissance unhindered access. Kennedy now stressed that he, too, wanted no shots fired. He also wanted the Pentagon generals eager to enforce the blockade (officially designated a “quarantine”) to know that although it was a military action, it was intended only to communicate a political message.

Public tension, however, persisted Thursday because work on the missile sites continued. But Kennedy let a Soviet oil tanker pass through the blockade after it identified itself and its cargo. And Friday morning, October 26, a Soviet ship allowed Americans to inspect what they knew would be innocent cargo. At the prospect of negotiation, however, Kennedy still could not decide what price he was willing to pay for a Soviet withdrawal of the missiles. ExComm (and the press) debated removing the U.S. missiles in Turkey, but the Turks would not cooperate.

The most unsettling hours were the next 24, which brought a maddening mix of good and bad news that once again rattled nerves in both Washington and Moscow. Three separate unofficial sources reported a Soviet inclination to withdraw from Cuba if the United States promised publicly to prevent another invasion of the island. And Friday night, in a rambling, highly emotional private message that he had obviously composed without the help of his advisers, Khrushchev implored Kennedy “not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war.” He said his weapons in Cuba were always intended to be “defensive,” and if Cuba’s safety were guaranteed, “the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear.”

“I think we’d have to do that because we weren’t going to invade them anyway,” Kennedy told ExComm. But early Saturday, Moscow broadcast a colder message asking as well for an American withdrawal from Turkey. The Turks publicly protested and urged American officials not to capitulate.

The Russians seemed to be upping the ante, and Kennedy feared that he would lose world support and sympathy if he held out against the reasonable-sounding proposal to trade off reciprocal missile bases. Then came the shocking news that an American U-2 pilot had been shot down over Cuba and killed, presumably by a Soviet SAM, and another U-2 was chased out of Soviet Siberia, where it had accidentally strayed. Were accidents and miscalculations propelling the United States and the Soviet Union toward war after all?

In another Kennedy-Reston conversation that night that I was invited to listen in on, the president expressed his greatest fear that diplomacy might not resolve the crisis after all. He said the reconnaissance simply had to continue, and if his planes were again molested, he might be forced to attack antiaircraft installations.

With the Pentagon pressing for just such an attack, the president made doubly sure that no one assumed he had already decided to strike. He told ExComm that unless more planes were shot down, he envisioned the slowest possible escalation of pressure on the Soviets—starting with a blockade of oil shipments to Cuba, then of other vital supplies—taking great care to avoid the nuclear conflagration that the American public so obviously feared. Eventually, perhaps, he would take a Russian ship in tow. And if he had to shoot, he thought it was wiser to sink a ship than to attack the missile sites.

Plainly neither Kennedy nor Khrushchev was anywhere near risking anything like a nuclear shoot-out.

Still, without much hope for negotiations, Kennedy yielded to advice from several ExComm members that he accept Khrushchev’s no-invasion bargain and ignore the bid for a missile swap in Turkey. The president signaled his readiness to guarantee that the United States would not attack Cuba if the missiles were withdrawn, but simultaneously sent his brother to tell Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin that the time for diplomacy was running out, that work on the missiles had to stop at once.

In delivering this ultimatum, however, Robert Kennedy also offered Khrushchev a sweetener: an oral promise to withdraw the missiles from Turkey within a few months, provided that this part of the deal was not disclosed. Only a half dozen Americans knew of this promise, and they, as well as the Russians, kept the secret for more than a decade.

A Collective Sigh of Relief

The sun shone bright in Washington Sunday morning, October 28, as Radio Moscow read out Khrushchev’s response to Kennedy’s offer. He said he had wanted only to protect the Cuban revolution, that work at the bases on the island had now stopped, and that he had issued orders to dismantle, crate and bring back “the weapons which you describe as offensive.”

Castro, bypassed in all the negotiations, threw a fit and refused to admit U.N. inspectors sent to the island to verify the de-armament, forcing homebound Soviet ships to uncover their missile cargoes for aerial inspection at sea. For a month, Castro even refused to let the Russians pack up their “gift” to him of several old Ilyushin bombers, which Kennedy also wanted removed.

President Kennedy, sensing Khrushchev’s discomfort in retreat, immediately warned his jubilant aides against gloating. He had now earned his spurs as a Cold Warrior and the political freedom to reach other deals with the Soviets, starting with a crisis “hot line,” a ban on aboveground nuclear tests and a live-and-let-live calm in Berlin. Thirteen months later he would be killed in Dallas—by a psychotic admirer of Fidel Castro.

Khrushchev emerged from the crisis with grudging respect for Kennedy and tried to share in the credit for moving toward a better relationship. But his generals and fellow oligarchs vowed never again to suffer such humiliation. Two years later, denouncing Khrushchev’s many “harebrained schemes,” they overthrew him, going on to spend themselves poor to achieve strategic weapons parity with the United States.

The Soviet Union and the United States never again stumbled into a comparable confrontation. Both nations acquired many more nuclear weapons than they would ever need, but they kept in close touch and learned to watch each other from orbiting satellites, to guard against surprise and miscalculation.

Condemned to Repeat?

The Cuban crisis had profound historical implications. The arms race burdened both superpowers and contributed to the eventual implosion of the Soviet empire. Other nations reached for the diplomatic prowess that nuclear weapons seemed to confer. And the ExCommers wrongly assumed that they could again use escalating military pressure to pursue a negotiated deal—in Vietnam. They failed because none of them could read Ho Chi Minh the way Tommy Thompson had read Khrushchev.

The philosopher George Santayana was obviously right to warn that “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” This past, however, acquired a rational, ordered form in our memories that ill prepared us for new and incoherent dangers. In our moments of greatest vulnerability—40 years ago and again last year—it was our inability to imagine the future that condemned us to suffer the shock of it.

ANKARA, Turkey — A hospital in southern Turkey on Saturday performed the world’s first triple limb transplant, attaching two arms and one leg to a 34-year-old man, an official said.

At the same time, a team of doctors at Akdeniz University Hospital, in the Mediterranean coastal city of Antalya, transplanted the face of the same donor onto another patient — a 19-year-old man. It was Turkey’s first face transplant.

“Today, we have put our signature on a world success,” Dr. Israfil Kurtcephe, the university hospital’s rector, told reporters after the two operations. “For the first time a hospital has transplanted two arms and a leg on one patient.”

via Turkish hospital performs world’s first triple limb transplant, separate face transplant – The Washington Post.

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