The closest example to the Tunisian experience is Turkey but Tunisia does not need secularism, the leader of the Tunisian Islamist Ennahda party Rached Ghannouchi said in a recent interview with Hürriyet Daily News.

“We need democracy and development in Tunisia and we strongly believe in the compatibility between Islam and democracy, between Islam and modernity. So we do not need secularism in Tunisia,” Ghannouchi said in an interview Dec. 23.

After forming the new Cabinet in Tunisia two months after the country’s first free elections, Ghannouchi visited Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the Prime Minister’s Office in Istanbul Dec. 23.

After a meeting with Erdoğan lasting an hour and a half, Ghannouchi said, “We expect many things from Turkey. We expect our relations will strengthen and cooperation will increase for the common interests of both countries, because we believe the closest experience to Tunisia is Turkish experience. We share many common elements and we expect our cooperation will develop in all fields.”

They also talked about the “main problems of the Muslim world,” Ghannouchi said. “Like what happened in Syria, in Libya, in Egypt, etcetera. and in the other countries where there are problems. We share many ideas on those issues.”

Regarding secularism, “There are some different contexts between Tunisia and Turkey in this field. We respect the choices of our friends in Turkey and they respect ours,” Ghannouchi said. Erdoğan’s message during his speech in Tunisia did not involve secularism, she added. “Erdoğan has not talked about secularism in Tunisia; he talked about secularism in Egypt.”

Ghannouchi also referred to the concerns over a radical Islamist sect called the “Salafis” in Tunisia. “Salafis in Tunisia is a new phenomenon. They do not express themselves in politics and they are minorities. They are part of our nation, they are citizens and they have the full right to express themselves as long as they do not use violence,” Ghannouchi said.

‘I guarantee women’s rights’

Ghannouchi refused claims there are concerns amongst some Tunisian women about losing their previously gained rights. “Most of Tunisian women are convinced Nahda does not constitute any threat to their rights. Out of 49 women in the Tunisian assembly, 42 of them are Nahda members. So Tunisian women believe Nahda does not form any threat to their rights; I guarantee their rights,” Ghannouchi said.

Ghannouchi said from now on their main aim would be realizing the goals of the revolution in Tunisia.

Tunisia’s Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali unveiled his new Cabinet Dec. 22, two months after the country’s first free elections, and vowed to make job creation and reparations to victims of the ousted regime among his key priorities.

The creation of a new government is a major milestone in Tunisia, following the popular revolt against Ben Ali that began in December 2010, and triggered what became known as the Arab spring; a series of uprisings across the Arab world that led to the overthrow of several veteran dictators.

Saturday, 24 December 2011

HDN

A new paper shows 18th- and 19th-century Ottoman rulers decriminalised homosexuality and promoted women’s education

Tehmina Kazi

guardian.co.uk, Friday 7 October 2011 11.29 BST

Pro-secular demonstrators in Istanbul carry a portrait of modern Turkey's founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Photograph: Murad Sezer/AP

Hardline Muslim groups often portray the Ottoman empire as a magic template for a global caliphate. This is then used as a springboard for grandiose arguments that paint a caliphate as viable, and deem it as the only credible model of governance for the future. These arguments are based on a belief that the empire adhered to a single interpretation of sharia (Islamic law) for over 600 years, and – crucially – that its success was contingent on this.

But a paper by Ishtiaq Hussain, published by Faith Matters on Saturday displays a very different picture. Ottoman sultans, or caliphs, in the 18th and 19th centuries launched secular schools and promoted the education of women. The period of reformation known as the Tanzimat saw customary and religious laws being replaced in favour of secular European ones. More surprisingly, homosexuality was decriminalised in 1858 (long before many western states took their cue, and over a century before the American Psychiatric Association declassified it as a mental illness in 1973). Contrary to the claims of hardline groups, religious authorities approved many of these measures.

In terms of broader social change, the Ottomans made strong attempts to integrate non-Muslim communities. On the cultural front, it is well known that a minority of people claim that Islam frowns upon artistic expression. However, the last sultan/caliph, Abdulmecid Efendi (1922-1924) has numerous paintings on display in Istanbul’s new museum of modern art; many others were also keen musicians and played a variety of musical instruments. It is therefore clear that the sultan/caliphs enunciated a progressive vision for a secular Muslim society, many years before al-Qaida and similar groups came into existence.

For those who dismiss President Ataturk’s vision as an anomaly, this reconsideration of their history must come as a nasty shock.

The purpose of Hussain’s paper is to encourage people who carry the baton for totalitarian ideologies – including those who are inspired by Anwar al-Awlaki – to think again. The recent deaths of al-Awlaki and his demagogue Osama bin Laden only mean that part of the battle is won.

The other part of the battle is ideological, and this paper boldly leads the way by challenging a key component of that ideology. It does a stellar job in exposing the fallacies that lie within extremist narratives. For example, why do some groups refer to the Ottoman empire as a “caliphate” when it did not synchronise state law with religious law?

When hardline groups present Islam as a rigid political ideology, they end up doing a great disservice to Islam and Muslim communities. One of Islam’s strengths is its relevance to all places and all times, which means that it can take on numerous expressions according to local circumstances. Scholars like Emory University professor Abdullahi An-Na’im recognise that the content of the sharia is bound to its historical context.

An-Naim maintains that concepts such as human rights and citizenship are more consistent with Islamic principles than a state which purports to be Islamic and enforces sharia. In his book, Islam and the Secular State, he goes as far as to suggest that the very idea of an Islamic state is based on European ideas of state and law, and not the Islamic tradition.

It is now more important than ever for greater numbers of individuals to stand up against fascism and extremism – no matter where it comes from. This is why groups like British Muslims for Secular Democracy (BMSD) – the organisation that I work for – have protested against both al-Muhajiroun (in their various guises) and Stop the Islamification of Europe.

Of course, we support the findings of this paper, and hope this is disseminated as widely as possible. I also hope this paper will get far-right groups to reconsider the history of Muslims in Europe, and make them realise the positive contribution Islam has made in countries like Turkey and Spain.

The importance of grassroots work to this end – in schools, universities, refugee centres and on social networking sites – cannot be underestimated. Finally, I would like to see the government develop a sound understanding of the issues in this paper, and their relevance to the British Muslim situation. This would be a fitting token of support for organisations like BMSD and Faith Matters.

via The Ottoman empire’s secular history undermines sharia claims | Tehmina Kazi | Comment is free | guardian.co.uk.

It has been a fashion in Turkish media in recent years to question and attack the ideology and accomplishments of Kemal Atatürk – a hero figure for the vast majority of Turks. Columnist Mustafa Akyol, who writes in Turkish Daily News, and who for years has been trying to discredit Atatürk, is one such media personalty.

This disturbing trend gained acceptance in certain journalistic circles within the past decade, in particular after the AK Party’s second electoral victoy in 2007. The growing influence of the Gülen Movement has given impetus to the Atatürk-bashing trend.

The attack comes mostly from radical conservatives and idealogs – some outright religious bigots -that cannot make peace with Atatürk’s legacy. These critics typically yearn for a “Second Turkish Republic” that have the markings of a bygone Ottoman era. In a conference held 3 months ago at the Kadir Has University in Istanbul, for example, Mr. Akyol reportedly expressed preference for the “democracy” of the Ottoman era!

The putative reason for Atatürk’s failing, according to these circles, is that Atatürk was anti-Islam, depriving Turks of the freedom to practice their faith. There are even some critics who castigate Atatürk for abolishing Caliphate.

It would be unrealistic to expect these critics, being imbued by religious prejudice, to appreciate what Atatürk has accomplished. Many of these critics like Mr. Akyol are apologists if not the products of the Gülen Movement, and they advocate an Islamist Turkey instead of a secular one. Most of them have joined hands with quack Creationists that assault Darwin’s Evolution Theory. All because it doesn’t fit with their religious dogma.

To realize the hollowness of their arguments, and why Atatürk was not anti-Islam, these opponents should read the works of such researchers as Sinan Meydan (e.g., “Cumhuriyet Tarihi Yalanları”) and Professor Ethem Ruhi Fiğlalı (e.g., “Atatürk And The Religion of Islam”). They will learn, for example, that Atatürk tried to free Islam from the shackles of dogma and advanced the notion that religion is a matter between an individual and God. This is also what Islam teaches. Atatürk eschewed “false prophets” that stood between man and God. He held that Islam should be in conformity with reason and logic. He sponsored the construction of mosques in Tokyo and Paris.

These are not the hallmarks of a leader who was anti-religion or anti-Islam.

But Atatürk’s accomplishments go far beyond religion: He freed the Turkish nation from the shackles of imperialism and introduced reforms toward a civil society, science and modernity – from alphabet to secularism to women’s rights. Thanks to his reforms, the decadence and backwardness of the waning years of the Ottoman Empire was left behind.

It was a call for the Turkish nation to catch up with the West in science and modernity. Turks could still practice their religion, but the State did not adopt or sponsor a particular religion.

If the opponents of Atatürk like Mr. Akyol are breathing freedom in Turkey today, they owe it to the leadership of Atatürk.

If Turkey has any realistic hopes to join the EU, it is because a measure of westernization that Atatürk’s reforms have ushered in. (Reversals in recent years notwithstanding ).

The secular establishment Atatürk founded – through the Republic – was requisite for democratization in Turkey.

It was for good reason that Professor Arnold M. Ludwig of Kentucky University, after 18 years of study of the world leaders of the 20^th century (“King of the Mountain”), picked Atatürk as the top winner among the contestants. That makes Atatürk a towering figure in world history. Opponents of Atatürk would do well to read that seminal book.

And it is also remarkable that the Greek Premier Eleftherios Venizelos, a former enemy of Turkey, nominated Atatürk for the 1934 Nobel Peace Prize.

The bigotry and ignorance of these opponents – pathetic as they are in their efforts – could be ignored if it were not for the fact that they regularly pontificate in printed and visual media. It is lamentable that these opponents do not show greater respect for the legacy of a visionary figure beloved by the vast majority of Turkish people. In no major newspaper in the U.S., for example, would one find derogatory remarks about George Washington.

Notwithstanding, there is little doubt that Atatürk will remain a towering historical figure among Turks. Reactionary forces that resist change and want to hold on to the past will not hold the Turkish nation hostage to their hatred and bigotry.

The West fought a hard and grueling battle for Enlightenment, and it eventually won. Turkey eventually will also win; for it must. This is what progress is about.

ATATURK SOCIETIES OF USA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM STRONGLY OPPOSE

THE TURKISH RULING PARTY’S DECLARED INTENTION
TO CHANGE “TURKEY’S FOUNDING PRINCIPLES” PROTECTED BY THE CURRENT CONSTITUTION

Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, PUBLICLY STATED its intention to change the Turkish Constitution right after the General Elections, scheduled for June 12, 2011.  Erdogan is asking  voters to enable him to come back to the Turkish Parliament with at least 367 deputies so that he can CHANGE THE TURKISH CONSTITUTION UNILATERALLY.

Erdogan is basing his arguments for a “new constitution” on his party’s desire to have a “more democratic and civil” constitution.  This is a disguise of his real intention to change “THE FOUNDING PRINCIPLES OF TURKEY”, explained in the PREAMBLE and enshrined in the FIRST FOUR articles of the CURRENT CONSTITUTION.

The letter and the spirit of the “preamble” and the “irrevocable first four articles” of the current Constitution reflect Ataturk’s philosophy and vision of a “PRO-WESTERN, MODERN, SECULAR, and DEMOCRATIC TURKEY, governed by the RULE OF LAW, EQUALITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, its NATIONAL UNITY AND INTERESTS DEFENDED.  These founding principles have been protected throughout several amendments of the Constitution since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923.

The AKP wants to Change Ataturk’s Philosophy and Vision

Since coming to power in 2002, the “Islamist AKP” has gradually but increasingly moved away from the Republic’s founding principles and national identity.  Numerous foreign observers as well as many Turks are convinced that the AKP is trying to transform Turkey into an Iranian-style Islamic state.  Despite its occasional official denials, the AKP’s actions and media statements demonstrate its clear intentions. Most recently, on May 10, 2011, a prominent AKP leader and a State Minister told the Turkish Press openly that “the only irrevocable article in the Turkish Constitution was Article 1, that Turkey was a ‘Republic’. All other articles, he said, could be (and will be !”) changed” once AKP has enough number of deputies in the Parliament. Today, even with less than 367 deputies, the AKP firmly controls the country’s  legislative and executive branches and already took control of the judiciary by appointing AKP-sympathetic prosecutors and judges.  Security forces are transformed into an oppression machine against opponents and protesters.  Academia is silenced by replacing university presidents.

TURKEY’S PRO-WESTERN identity and image have already been tarnished. Initially, the AKP renounced its Islamic heritage and began working to secure European Union(EU)-membership, and turn Turkey into an even more liberal and pro-Western state.  However, more than eight years later, the AKP seems anything but pro-Western, liberal and democratic !  It has returned firmly to its Islamist roots.  Erdogan has openly played the “Islamist card” in order to boost himself and his political party, and establish greater dominance in the “Islamic world”.  Under the AKP rule, liberal political trends have quickly disappeared and EU accession talks have stalled. In foreign policy, relations with the West and Israel have deteriorated.  President Gul and Erdogan spent more time visiting Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar, Syria and Egypt, and hosted a series of anti-Western leaders  including Sudan’s president Al-Bashir when the Hague International tribunal was accusing Al-Bashir committing atrocities in Darfur.  Al-Bashir, who received a warm welcome from Erdogan, was defending the implementation of Sheria Law in resolving the Darfur conflict.  Turkey’s foreign policy has shifted decidedly towards the East and promoted solidarity with Islamist, anti-Western regimes.

SECULARISM has been denied and ignored…  Erdogan’s famous quote “one can not be a Moslem and secular at the same time” best explains his political philosophy and intentions…Under the AKP rule, religiosity in Turkey has increased markedly. The government began to hire top bureaucrats from an exclusive pool of religious candidates and the percentage of women in executive positions in government, dropped sharply. Religious observance has become a necessity for those seeking government appointments or lucrative state contracts.  Bureaucrats in Ankara now feel compelled to attend Friday prayers lest they be by passed for promotions.  Turkey today has over 85,000 active mosques, one for every 350 citizens, the highest per capita in the world, compared to one hospital for every 60,000 citizens, with 90,000 imams, more imams than doctors or teachers.  It has opened up thousands of madrasa-like Imam-Hatip schools and about four thousand more official, state-run Qur’an courses.  Spending by the government’s Directorate of Religious Affairs has grown five fold from 553 trillion Turkish liras in 2002 to 2.7 quadrillion Turkish liras (about US$325 million), during the first four years of the AKP government. The Directorate has a larger budget than 8 other ministries combined. The objective is to train people for every position in the public service in the country.  The AKP has also fought very hard, though unsuccessfully, to lift the ban on “head scarves” in schools and government offices.
Erdogan’s desire to change the Constitution unilaterally and his disrespect for secularism may lead to a turnaround in Turkey’s founding principles, and put the country under governance by Islamic Sheria Law.

DEMOCRACY and FREEDOMS have been severely restricted.  The mysterious Ergenekon case has become the largest and most controversial judicial investigation in recent Turkish history.  Hundreds of people, mostly opponents of AKP and Erdogan,  including the high-ranking Army officers, famous journalists, writers, artists, university professors, and heads of modern, secular civil societies have been detained, mostly in multiple simultaneous dawn raids by members of the Counterterrorism Department of the Turkish National Police (TNP).  They are tried under detention that has been going on for  more than three years without any sign of conclusion.  None of the detainees has been  convicted, yet.

At the same time, severe restrictions have been put on “freedom of speech” and “freedom of press”. On April 2010, Turkey’s Justice Minister said that police intelligence listens to the private conversations of 70,000 people; almost one in every 1,000 Turks live in police scrutiny today.  Turkey also ranks at the bottom of the list in Western Europe with regard to the “freedom of press”.  The President of Turkish Journalists Union (TGS) complained that there are thousands of cases filed against journalists, more than hundred filed by Erdogan alone.  Currently about 100 Turkish journalists are in jail.  One of them was arrested even before the book was published, for authoring a book that investigates the grip on Turkish politics of a religious group.  The police seized and burned the unpublished book, while imposing a ban on its internet accessibility. Working closely with the PM’s office, the Turkish Telecom and Communication Ministry (TIB) put thousands of wire tabs on political rivals and  introduced censorship on “Google” and  “YouTube” many times.  TIB recently announced its intention to impose, more restrictions on internet.  The great majority of the independent media, critical of the government, were forced through unclear legal reasons to sell their businesses, daily newspapers and TV stations to AKP supporters.  As a result, the share of Turkish media held by religious, pro-AKP groups rose from about 20 to over 65 percent, at present. In these sale transactions, large credits were granted to AKP supporters from state-owned banks. Furthermore, the Public Procurement Law was amended several times and thresholds for tenders reduced steadily to avoid competitive bidding and allow sales to AKP supporters.

We oppose to any change in Turkey’s “Founding Principles and Vision”

We, the members of the Ataturk Societies of USA and the United Kingdom, STRONGLY OPPOSE  AKP’s plan to change the constitution and remove the “founding principles of Turkey” from its text.  Even with these principles in place in current Constitution, the AKP has moved ahead with its Islamist agenda and already tarnished Turkey’s pro-Western, modern, secular and democratic identity and image.  With the removal of Ataturk’s philosophy and vision from the Constitution, it would be harder, if not impossible,  to prevent Turkey’s slide into an  anti-Western, anti-Democratic, and anti-Secular Islamist  state.*

References:
1.  Turkish Constitutional Court Documents. (Ankara ) May 27, 2011;
2.  “Degismez Maddeler Degisebilir !” Bulent Arinc, Radikal (Istanbul) May 10, 2011
3.  “The Islamists Show Their Hand” and “Abandoning Ataturk”, Soner Cagaptay,
Newsweek, Feb.14, 2009 and Newsweek, Sept. 19, 2009
4.  “Sayilarla Kendine Gelmek…” Can Dundar, Milliyet (Istanbul), June 22, 2007
5.  “Turkey’s Turning Point”, Michael Rubin, Apr. 14, 2008
6.  “Ergenekon – Between Fact or Fantasy”, Gareth H. Jenkins, Silk Road Papers, Aug.2009
7.  “Corruption in Public Procurement – Turkey “Global Integrity Report, 2008

A conference on anti-Muslim hatred throughout Britain and Europe.

• Saturday 21 May 2011, 11-6pm
• London Muslim Centre Whitechapel Road, London E1 1JX

Speakers include:

• John Esposito – Georgetown University
• Tony Benn – Anti-war campaigner
• Mehdi Hassan - New Statesman
• Robert Lambert – European Muslim Research Centre
• Hiba Aburwein – European Forum on Muslim Women
• Peter Oborne - Daily Telegraph
• Liz Fekete – Institute of Race Relations
• Seumas Milne – The Guardian
• Salma Yaqoob – Respect
• Dr Sabine Schiffer – Germany
• Dr AbdoolKarim Vakil – Muslim Council of Britain
• Les Levidow – Campaign Against Criminalising Communities
• And many others

Muslims at prayer in Turkey

The Sunni Islamic doctrine has changed so little since the Middle Ages that there is not much difference between the Taliban in Afghanistan and Turkey, the Religious Affairs Directorate’s research office director, Niyazi Kahveci, told U.S. officials during a visit on Nov. 14, 1996, according to another recently leaked cable, reported Hurriyet.

Later, as more cables revealed, US diplomats have observed that Islam in Turkey is not “monolithic” and is politically divided, with both secularists and conservative Islamists trying to manipulate religion’s role in public affairs to their own ends.

A June 27, 2003, diplomatic cable, released Wednesday by WikiLeaks’ Turkish partner, daily Taraf, also claimed the country’s Religious Affairs Directorate is suppressing Islamic beliefs that do not fit the official version.

The Turkish version of secularism is “180 degrees opposite” of the U.S. version as it is not one embraced by the people and protected by the Constitution but “divinized” by the Constitution and forced on the people, the cable also said.

According to the cable, Turkey’s Religious Affairs Directorate and the institutions within its scope are not separated from the state but are to the contrary, an indivisible part of it.

It noted that the directorate was among the biggest official institutions in Turkey, with 90,000 personnel as of 2003, and that it employs all the imams in Turkey and controls the contents of their preaching.

The directorate produces a “Kemalist Islam” that has little to do with the beliefs held in the “less elite” corners of Anatolia, the cable said, adding that the directorate is oppressing forms of Islam, including the pro-secular faction of Alevism, that do not fit the official version, according to Hurriyet.

via US Fears Millions of ‘Potential Terrorists’ in Turkey | Asbarez Armenian News.

With the overthrow of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak on Friday after thirty years in power, it appears increasingly likely that the long-outlawed Muslim Brotherhood will gain political clout in whatever new government emerges in Cairo.

Globe file photo: Supporters of Turkey's Justice and Developpment Party (AKP) waved national and Palestinian flags at a 2009 rally.

The Brotherhood, suppressed under Mubarak, advocates an “Islamist” agenda, which has alarmed some American analysts worried about the possibility of Egypt turning into a new Iran. But others have argued that the danger posed by the Brotherhood is exaggerated and point to Turkey, where a conservative Muslim party has been in power since 2002, as proof that an Islamic religious movement can coexist with democracy in the Middle East.

Indeed, Turkey has been cited by many as a model for the whole Arab world as it seeks to cope with the demands of greater democratization, economic prosperity, and political representation.

But comparisons to Turkey should be approached with caution. Despite their superficial similarities, the Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) have little in common, Egypt and Turkey represent different political traditions, and the shape of any possible government in Cairo is unlikely to look much like that in Ankara. The Muslim Brotherhood doesn’t look to Turkey for inspiration — and neither should secularists worried about how to contain them.

The first lesson to internalize is that the AKP, despite rhetoric that to some Western ears may sound similar to the Brotherhood’s, is a far cry from more hard-line groups in the region. The Turkish political vocabulary simply does not provide for such concepts as shariato advance an “Islamist” political agenda, as promoted by groups such as the Brotherhood.

Turkey’s geo-political traditions also offer checks on extremism that differ from Egypt’s. As the former imperial head of the Middle East, Turkey inherited a legacy of strong institutions personified by the highly visible role of the military. Turkey is also a member of NATO, and has had a privileged geo-strategic value to the West that provides a moderating influence.

Turkey, unlike Egypt, also has accommodated Islamist groups for decades, which has produced a tradition of Islamic parties playing by the rules that simply does not exist in Egypt. Turkey has experienced four military coups, but since the 1950s has been a multi-party democracy where the military chose to exert its power behind the scenes and allow more conservative Muslim parties to compete as long as civilian politicians abided by the constitutions the military wrote. Attempts to discredit and ban political parties that advocate an explicitly Islamist agenda has kept the AKP committed to Turkey’s secular rules of the political game, and is largely why they have been so successful. The AKP have won every election since its emergence in 2002 as a religious conservative party, whereas the Brotherhood has never played in or by the rules in Egypt — in part because Egyptian authorities moved so aggressively against Islamist parties, leaving them no place in the system.

Because it must compete, the AKP also speaks to Turks across a much wider range of issues. Today the AKP speaks for a large portion of the Turkish voters who want to see changes made in the approach and character of both their Republic and its international relations toward the West and Israel. With a majority of the Turkish parliament and municipal administrations controlled by the AKP since 2002, the very structure of the secular Turkish Republic is beginning to change. Not through a radical revolution, but rather through an incremental and technical process mandated by the Turkish constitution, something the Brotherhood has never been a part of in Egypt. The AKP draws its strength from its pragmatism not its ideology, a lesson that is often overlooked in the contentious debates about Turkey’s “turn to the East.”

With the fastest growing and largest economy in the Middle East, Turkey is uniquely placed to play a decisive role in providing incentives for the newly transformed governments and movements of the region. As a longtime ally of the West and new partner of the Middle East, Turkey has been seeking the role of mediator in every available arena including Egypt, Lebanon, and Tunisia. The AKP has been hosting delegations from Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Muslim Brotherhood since its arrival to power in Ankara and has boasted of itsmoderating effect. This is something Egypt is nowhere close to doing and on which the Muslim Brotherhood has shown little interest given their dogmatic ideological stance.

At the end of the day, the AKP is a uniquely Turkish phenomenon unlikely to be repeated. Turkey did not transform itself from a defeated post-Ottoman state led by Ataturk’s military to a flourishing market-democracy overnight — it has been almost a century in the making. Before pundits turn Turkey into a role model for the post-Mubarak Egypt, we should have a better understanding of the very different contexts in which they have arisen.

Joshua W. Walker is a post-doctoral fellow at the Crown Center at Brandeis University and a research fellow at the Belfer Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.

http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/blogs/the_angle/2011/02/turkish_lessons.html, February 13, 2011

The New Republic, February 2, 2011

Patrick Baz /AFP/Getty Images - Egyptian demonstrators hold up a placard in Cairo as protesters flooded Tahrir Square in their relentless drive to oust President Hosni Mubarak's regime. If Mubarak's government falls, Egypt may have to navigate a transitional period.

Jonathan Schanzer is vice president for research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Khairi Abaza is a senior fellow at FDD, and a former Wafd Party official.

President Mubarak’s government may soon collapse. Popular support for him has evaporated, and while the Obama administration has declined to officially take sides in the Egyptian protests, it is clearly looking toward some sort of endgame. But what form would such a transition take? Oddly, the most obvious possibility is a plan that has, in its broad contours, been around since the mid-1980s.

In September 1980, Turkey’s government was overthrown in a military coup, but the military cooperated with interim civilian leaders and ultimately presided over a peaceful democratic transition that included the creation of a new constitution in 1982 and elections in 1983. This example inspired members of Egypt’s nationalistic, business-oriented Wafd Party, which was resurrected — after disappearing in 1952 — at about the same time. So in 1984, a plan based on Turkey’s experience was drawn up and presented by Ibrahim Abaza, a member of the executive bureau (and the father of one of this article’s authors), Yusuf Hamed Zaki, a member of the party’s high committee, and a handful of others. It envisioned a military-backed caretaker government that could maintain order on the streets, create a safe political space, and then guide the nation into representative governance. While Egyptian newspapers debated the merits of the plan, the Mubarak regime, which had been in power for only a few years, ignored it. Similarly, several successive U.S. presidential administrations listened politely, but opted not to pressure their allies in Cairo.

Now, former International Atomic Energy Agency Chief Mohammed ElBaradei and his followers are demanding a series of reforms that track closely along these lines. As ElBaradei explained to CNN’s Fareed Zakaria on Sunday, “the next step … as everybody now agrees on, is a transitional period” followed by “a government of national salvation, of national unity” that would “prepare the grounds for a new constitution and free and fair elections” while the “army will be able to control the situation.”

Echoing the Wafd Plan, ElBaradei hopes the military will ensure that President Mubarak flees the country and then keeps the peace during a period of transition to democracy. To safeguard against abuses of power, the opposition plan would ensure that no one figure holds a monopoly of authority within the provisional government. Order would be maintained by the military, while an interim cabinet would handle political matters and the transition to democracy. Cooperation between the two would be critical.

The plan also envisions a gradual, managed transition to open political competition that would give political parties — which have suffocated under Mubarak’s rule — time to put down roots and sprout branches. The process would be designed to mitigate the power of the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups that reject democratic principles, without excluding them entirely from the political process. The transition period of a year or more would potentially level the playing field; the Brotherhood has a head start on everyone else, having developed social infrastructure throughout the country, and significant grassroots support.

Egypt would also need an interim president — such as ElBaradei or recently appointed Vice President Omar Suleiman — who would oversee the drafting of a new constitution that guarantees the liberties of all Egyptians. This is particularly necessary because the political opposition stands unanimously against the current constitution, which is based on socialist and non-democratic principles.

After this transition period yields a governing document and functioning political parties, Egyptians would go to the polls, while the military would ensure the safety of the voters and international vote monitors, who must be invited into the country to observe and certify free and fair elections.

For President Obama, supporting such a plan would make good sense. It would enable him at last to shun Mubarak and support the Egyptian people, while doing everything possible to ensure that the Muslim Brotherhood does not fill the country’s political vacuum. It should also be attractive to Washington because it relies on the Egyptian military. True, this is the same military that started this mess with the Free Officer’s Coup of 1952, but it still has the trust of the people (it has not fired on the protestors). President Obama might even have a little leverage here, thanks to the estimated $2 billion per year in aid that buys Egypt advanced military hardware.

This is not a plan without risks, but inaction carries risks of its own. Embraced by the reformers and protest leaders, the plan prescribes concrete steps toward democracy while minimizing the likelihood of chaos or Islamist rule. And the fact that it has its origins in the Wafd Party means it is an indigenous idea, not a foreign imposition on the Egyptian people.

What Should The U.S. Do To Encourage Democracy? Feb. 2, 2011

The Limited Influence Of The U.S. In Egypt’s Upheaval Feb. 1, 2011

Partner content from: THE NEW REPUBLIC

www.npr.org, February 2, 2011