Judging from the press reports, one would not know it, but Turkey, the presumed supporter of the Nabucco gas project, recently helped kill the project.

It was not to be so. After all, the Nabucco project was designed not only to supply natural gas to the EU from the Caspian region and the Middle East, but also help Turkey meet its domestic needs. The intergovernmental agreement signed in Ankara amid media publicity in July 2009, followed by parliamentary seal of approval in March 2010, gave all the indications that Turkey would stand by the project.

Turkey’s BOTAS was one of the 6 partners that developed the project. The Vienna-based NIC (Nabucco International Company) represented the consortium formed by the partners. The 3,900 km-long pipeline’s planned destination was Baumgarten in Austria.

Not that the project was ideal for Turkey (http://eurasiacritic.com/articles/nabucco-challenge-eu-and-partially-fulfilled-promise-turkey). But compared to its rivals ITGI (Italy-Greece Interconnector) and TAP (Trans-Adriatic Pipeline), not to mention a host of “exotic” Black Sea options flagged by Azerbaijan, it was the most mature and most comprehensive gas pipeline project to connect Turkey and the EU to the supply sources to the east. Strategically it deserved Turkey’s support. It was the only project among its rivals that aimed to transport Azeri as well as non-Azeri gas. Turkmen gas was a high-priority objective.

Surely, with its ambitious design capacity of 31 billion m3 (bcm)/year, Nabucco was under stress. What was holding the project from implementation was the lack of feed (throughput) gas. The feed gas problem caused delays in the project, and the capital costs soared (up to EUR 14-15 billion by most recent estimates). The Azeri Shah Deniz-II gas was identified as the initial start-up gas as from 2017-2018.

But Azerbaijan, that owned the gas, and the Shah Deniz consortium that would share and produce it, were non-committal about supplying gas. That meant major headache for Nabucco. Turkmen gas input required the cooperation of Azerbaijan, and would be added to the gas stream at a later date.

In the meantime, the rival projects ITGI and TAP emerged. Like Nabucco, these also counted on Shah Deniz-II gas for throughput. A winner-take-all pipeline contest was in the works.

Still, Nabucco had a good fighting chance. On October 1, 2011, NIC submitted its proposal to the Shah Deniz consortium tabling transport terms. The rival projects ITGI and TAP did the same. A high-stakes waiting game would then start, during which the Shah Deniz consortium would pick the winner.

The spoiler project

All that changed when BP (British Petroleum), at the last minute before the October 1 deadline, came up with a new, “in-house” project: SEEP (South-East Europe Pipeline). It was a shrewd move, and immediately caught the attention of the Shah Deniz consortium – where BP is the operator and a major (25.5%) stake holder. The Azeri partner SOCAR, in particular, quickly warmed up to BP’s proposal.

Instead of building a new pipeline across the Turkish territory, SEEP envisioned the use of BOTAS’ existing network (with upgrades) in Turkey and construction of new pipelines and their integration with existing interconnectors past Turkey. Azeri gas would be the feed gas. The destination would still be Austria, but the cost would be much less than that of Nabucco.

Nabucco had come under threat.

Behind the scenes

Events behind the scenes further undermined Nabucco. On October 25 Ankara and Baku signed an intergovernmental agreement in Izmir in western Turkey. Details released to the press were sketchy, but one of the accords reached was to use initially BOTAS’ existing network in Turkey, and later build a new pipeline when needed, to ship Shah Deniz II gas to Turkey and the EU. Starting in 2017 or 2018, of the total 16 bcm gas to be produced annually from the Shah Deniz-II phase, Turkey would receive 6 bcm, and the rest 10 bcm would be shipped to the EU.

Azerbaijan would be the direct seller of gas to the EU, with Turkey being a mere bridge or transit route.

No mention was made of Nabucco, ITGI, TAP, or SEEP in the press release, but the footprints of SEEP were unmistakable.

Demise of Nabucco

Still worse news followed. On November 17, during the Third Black Sea Energy and Economic Forum held in Istanbul, SOCAR chief Rovnag Abdullayev announced that a new gas pipeline, which he named “Trans-Anatolia,” would be built in Turkey from east to west under the leadership of SOCAR. The new pipeline would deliver Shah Deniz II gas to Turkey and Europe.

Azerbaijan and Turkey had already started working on the pipeline project, he said, and others could possibly join later. The planned capacity was at least 16 bcm/year –large enough to absorb all future Azeri exports after depletion of Shah Deniz II.

While not stated so, the announcement made Nabucco effectively redundant. The announcement was an offtake from the Izmir agreement, and signaled a surprising, 180-degree turn on the part of Turkey on Nabucco.

Turkey’s energy minister Yildiz Taner tried to put the best face in the press by claiming that Trans-Anatolian would “supplement” Nabucco, while the NIC chief Reinhard Mitschek expressed his “confidence” in Nabucco.

More recently SOCAR’s Abdullayev maintained that Nabucco was still “in the race,” and NIC started the pre-qualification process for procurement contractors.

For all these business-as-usual pronouncements, however, there was little doubt that Nabucco had received a fatal blow. If Trans-Anatolia, dedicated to Shah Deniz II gas, is built, Nabucco will lose its start-up gas, and with it the justification for a new infrastructure across Turkey.

Without synergy from the Azeri gas, a full-fledged Nabucco project dedicated solely to Turkmen gas will also have a virtually zero chance of implementation.

Nabucco, in its present form, was dead. (See also http://crude.bpcares.co.uk/2011/11/07/comment-the-nabucco-pipeline-project-is-dead-oil-gas-journal/). A much-modified, “truncated” version of Nabucco, starting at the Turkey-Bulgaria border, may well emerge, however.

Conclusion

With Nabucco frozen in its tracks, the geopolitics of energy in Turkey and its neighborhood has changed dramatically (http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/bp-socar-duo-coup-de-grace-to-nabucco). What is surprising is that Turkey assisted in undermining a project that it had long supported. It was a project that encompassed both Azeri and Turkmen gas. To reduce its dependence on Russia for its gas exports, Turkmenistan has been eager to ship its gas to the West.

Azerbaijan, apparently viewing Turkmen gas exports to the West a threat to its own gas exports, has been reluctant to cooperate with Ashgabat on this issue.

Turkey acceded to the aspirations of the Azeri brethren, while ignoring those of the Turkmen brethren. Over the past year, as the EU delegates approached repeatedly Ashgabat for Turkmen gas (vis-à-vis a TCGP or Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline), Turkey chose to stay on the sidelines. This was a strategic mistake.

Both Baku and Ashgabat could benefit from a synergy between the Azeri and Turkmen gaz exports, and Turkey could use gas from both sources to enhance its energy security. Being pro-active on TGCP and nudging Azerbaijan in that direction would have been a wise move for Turkey. On balance, there is little doubt that on the gas issue Azerbaijan has played its cards well – perhaps too well!

ferruh@demirmen.com

It has been a fashion in Turkish media in recent years to question and attack the ideology and accomplishments of Kemal Atatürk – a hero figure for the vast majority of Turks. Columnist Mustafa Akyol, who writes in Turkish Daily News, and who for years has been trying to discredit Atatürk, is one such media personalty.

This disturbing trend gained acceptance in certain journalistic circles within the past decade, in particular after the AK Party’s second electoral victoy in 2007. The growing influence of the Gülen Movement has given impetus to the Atatürk-bashing trend.

The attack comes mostly from radical conservatives and idealogs – some outright religious bigots -that cannot make peace with Atatürk’s legacy. These critics typically yearn for a “Second Turkish Republic” that have the markings of a bygone Ottoman era. In a conference held 3 months ago at the Kadir Has University in Istanbul, for example, Mr. Akyol reportedly expressed preference for the “democracy” of the Ottoman era!

The putative reason for Atatürk’s failing, according to these circles, is that Atatürk was anti-Islam, depriving Turks of the freedom to practice their faith. There are even some critics who castigate Atatürk for abolishing Caliphate.

It would be unrealistic to expect these critics, being imbued by religious prejudice, to appreciate what Atatürk has accomplished. Many of these critics like Mr. Akyol are apologists if not the products of the Gülen Movement, and they advocate an Islamist Turkey instead of a secular one. Most of them have joined hands with quack Creationists that assault Darwin’s Evolution Theory. All because it doesn’t fit with their religious dogma.

To realize the hollowness of their arguments, and why Atatürk was not anti-Islam, these opponents should read the works of such researchers as Sinan Meydan (e.g., “Cumhuriyet Tarihi Yalanları”) and Professor Ethem Ruhi Fiğlalı (e.g., “Atatürk And The Religion of Islam”). They will learn, for example, that Atatürk tried to free Islam from the shackles of dogma and advanced the notion that religion is a matter between an individual and God. This is also what Islam teaches. Atatürk eschewed “false prophets” that stood between man and God. He held that Islam should be in conformity with reason and logic. He sponsored the construction of mosques in Tokyo and Paris.

These are not the hallmarks of a leader who was anti-religion or anti-Islam.

But Atatürk’s accomplishments go far beyond religion: He freed the Turkish nation from the shackles of imperialism and introduced reforms toward a civil society, science and modernity – from alphabet to secularism to women’s rights. Thanks to his reforms, the decadence and backwardness of the waning years of the Ottoman Empire was left behind.

It was a call for the Turkish nation to catch up with the West in science and modernity. Turks could still practice their religion, but the State did not adopt or sponsor a particular religion.

If the opponents of Atatürk like Mr. Akyol are breathing freedom in Turkey today, they owe it to the leadership of Atatürk.

If Turkey has any realistic hopes to join the EU, it is because a measure of westernization that Atatürk’s reforms have ushered in. (Reversals in recent years notwithstanding ).

The secular establishment Atatürk founded – through the Republic – was requisite for democratization in Turkey.

It was for good reason that Professor Arnold M. Ludwig of Kentucky University, after 18 years of study of the world leaders of the 20^th century (“King of the Mountain”), picked Atatürk as the top winner among the contestants. That makes Atatürk a towering figure in world history. Opponents of Atatürk would do well to read that seminal book.

And it is also remarkable that the Greek Premier Eleftherios Venizelos, a former enemy of Turkey, nominated Atatürk for the 1934 Nobel Peace Prize.

The bigotry and ignorance of these opponents – pathetic as they are in their efforts – could be ignored if it were not for the fact that they regularly pontificate in printed and visual media. It is lamentable that these opponents do not show greater respect for the legacy of a visionary figure beloved by the vast majority of Turkish people. In no major newspaper in the U.S., for example, would one find derogatory remarks about George Washington.

Notwithstanding, there is little doubt that Atatürk will remain a towering historical figure among Turks. Reactionary forces that resist change and want to hold on to the past will not hold the Turkish nation hostage to their hatred and bigotry.

The West fought a hard and grueling battle for Enlightenment, and it eventually won. Turkey eventually will also win; for it must. This is what progress is about.

Taner Akçam, Associate Professor of History at Clark University (Worcester, MA) and the “prince charming” of the Armenian lobby, got himself trapped in contradictions on interpreting the results of Turkey’s recent (September 12) referendum on Constitutional changes. He inadvertently brought to surface some unsavory aspects of his past. Akçam’s younger brother, Cahit Akçam, used the occasion to mock the elder brother and charged him with betrayal.

taner akcam

Taner Akçam is an occasional contributor to Turkey’s Taraf, an off-base newspaper that is a staunch supporter of Turkey’s AKP (AK Party, Justice and Development Party). Rumored to be funded by the USA-based Gülen movement, and according to some also by the CIA, it is staffed largely by ex-liberal socialists that are now far to the right. Cahit Akçam is a columnist at Turkey’s left-leaning Birgün newspaper. The AKP is Turkey’s Islamic-rooted ruling party.

What got Taner Akçam into trouble was an op-ed he wrote in Taraf titled “Seeking Milosevic” that attacked Birgün. He took issue with Birgün’s headline news that the referendum had confirmed the 60% right-wing and 40% left-wing split in the country, and that the nationalist conservative votes had consolidated at the AKP. In what was a victory for the AKP, the referendum passed by a margin of 58%.

http://www.birgun.net/actuels_index.php?news_code=1284363022&year=2010&month=09&day=13

http://taraf.com.tr/haber/milosevic-i-aramak.htm

By drawing an analogy between Birgün and Slobodan Milosevic of ex-Yugoslavia, Akçam implicitly accused the newspaper of supporting nationalistic, racist and genocidal sentiments.

Neighborhood concept

Taner Akçam couldn’t accept Birgün’s view that the 40% of the referendum voters, that had voted “no,” were really left-wing. Noting that mass-killer Slobodan Milosevic, while called a communist and a socialist, had done horrible things, he argued that likewise in Turkey those who voted “no” couldn’t be called true socialists. The naysayers were the main opposition party CHP (Republican People’s Party) and the military-bureaucracy faction. The latter had organized and defended military coups in Turkey, he argued.

According to Akçam, labeling these groups “socialists,” as Birgün did, stemmed from a hatred of the AKP. Akçam called the 40% the “bourgeois group.” He maintained that this hatred is best explained through the “neighborhood” metaphor.

In Akçam’s view, Turkey is founded on “our” and “other” neighborhoods. The first neighborhood is one of “city people” that includes bureaucrats, the military, and the like. The CHP and the Ottoman-era İttihat ve Terakki Partisi (Committee of Union and Progress, CUP) are included in this group.

The “other” neighborhood comprises artisans and peasants that have strong religious identities. This neighborhood is now expanding and encroaching on the “city people” neighborhood.

Akçam sees himself in the “city people” neighborhood, which he calls “ours.”

Contradiction and myopia

But by doing so, Akçam fell into a gasping contradiction, because this is also the group that he labeled “bourgeoisie.” How could someone, with a well-known Marxist background, and calling himself a socialist, be part of the bourgeois group? (Separate from his self-confessed connection to the terrorist PKK organization during 1981-84, Akçam escaped from Turkish prison in 1977 after having been convicted of left-wing terrorist activities aimed at, among others, NATO military and American personnel).

Surprisingly enough, Akçam supports the “other” neighborhood – the conservative, Islamic group solidly backed by Taraf. This is because he thinks this group has strong democratic credentials.

It doesn’t take a professor’s prescience to know that such an argument is plain vacuous.

With the AKP in control – political lords of the 60% group – Turkey today is far removed from democracy – the illegal wiretappings, indefinite detentions and imprisonment of the opponents (including 47 journalists) of the government, an atmosphere of fear permeating the country, mandatory religious education, widespread penetration of Gülenist elements in the state apparatus, in particular the police, appalling inequality between men and women, systematic efforts (re: the referendum) to bring the judiciary under the control of the government, parliamentary immunity, etc. None of these inequities seems to bother the professor.

In Turkey today the press is under siege, and by Prime Minister’s own admission, “Those that are impartial [to the AKP] should be eliminated.” There are more detainees in prison than those convicted. Many detained under the so-called “Ergenekon case” don’t even know the exact charges against them.

No scruples, and no loyalty

Akçam’s contradictions and distortions also caught the attention of his younger brother Cahit Akçam. Responding to the elder Akçam in Birgün, Cahit Akçam couldn’t hide his scorn. In a blistering, two-part rebuttal titled “Really, you are the child of which neighborhood?” he chastised his brother, and mockingly called on him to come to his senses. His article started with a quotation (and an admonition) from Anton Chekhov: “Others’ sins do not make you a saint.”

http://www.birgun.net/actuels_index.php?news_code=1285921168&year=2010&month=10&day=01

http://www.birgun.net/actuels_index.php?news_code=1286441094&year=2010&month=10&day=07

Cahit Akçam called the elder Akçam’s “our” vs. “other” neighborhood analysis, with “Marxist-smelling” questions, “light” and meaningless because it was not founded on class distinction. Neither neighborhood as described by Taner embraced the working class. Asking the rhetorical question as to how Taner could overlook the working class, the younger Akçam thought that his brother, in what appeared to be sheer hypocrisy, didn’t really care for the working class.

Continued the younger brother sarcastically: “Luckily, Taner at least didn’t ignore the bourgeois class in ‘our’ neighborhood.” He chaffed at his brother for not mentioning the bourgeois class in the “other” neighborhood, i.e., the Islamist businessmen that the Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan had braggingly called “The Anatolian Tigers.”

Wondering how his brother could not know that the bourgeois class cannot exist without a working class, Cahit mocked his brother: “He is a big professor. True, not a sociology professor, but a history professor nonetheless. He has licked and swallowed a thousand times more than we have. He knows that, to be so ignorant, one does not have to be a professor. For Taner, the working class has little value.”

The elder Akçam was tersely reminded of the struggles of Turkey’s working class since 1900.

Cahit continued his criticism by making reference to a Turkish metaphor – referring to lentil meal – that this is all that the Taner could muster as an argument. Referring to Taner’s claim that all the “infamous” events in Turkey’s history emanated from “our” class, he bristled at Taner’s suggestion that the socialists, through the CHP, were like relatives to the military- bureaucracy.

He mockingly called attention to the fact that the socialists had suffered immensely from the 1980 fascistic military coup.

Recalling how the elder Akçam had defended the causes of right-wing, fascist elements in Turkey’s recent history, how he had failed to come to the defense of socialists who had been falsely accused of coup attempts, his denialist past, and how he had let down even his own family, the younger Akçam weighed in angrily: “How can Taner accuse his old friends, and even his own brother, as potential perpetrators of genocide?”

Barely concealing his disdain, Cahit asked of his brother: “As you place the blame on your own neighborhood, can there be a more harrowing psychological ruin [for you]?  … Where is your heart, and your conscience?”

The ultimate indignity came when the younger Akçam concluded that only someone who was politically and ideologically blind, and someone who had lost his scruples and his sense of loyalty, could do what his brother had done.

In the background of such emotional outburst was the fact that, while Taner Akçam jumped the prison in 1977 into the safety of Germany and escaped the tribulations of the 1980 military coup, in the coup’s aftermath his brother was put on trial for unauthorized activities, faced death by hanging, and was imprisoned for 8 years. Obviously, a lecture on fascism and the struggles of socialists was the last thing the younger Akçam wanted to hear from a sibling he considered unscruppled and untrustworthy.

A revisionist professor

There was more to Akçam’s false accusations. He twisted history and put finger on “our neighborhood’ as the perpetrator of the May 27 (1960), March 12 (1971) and – obliquely – September 12 (1980) military interventions in Turkey. Evidently to hide his own past, and the embarrassment therewith, in his accounting he glossed over the 1980 military coup and the events (including his role) that preceded it.

He dallied further into the past and noted that his “neighborhood” was also responsible for the so-called “Armenian genocide” and the Dersim events (1937).

But he was quick to disown any blame – a point that also drew ridicule from the younger Akçam. Instead, Taner Akçam conveniently placed the blame on “our administrators.” Socialists like him, while closely affiliated with the administrators, had deep disagreements with them. It was all the fault of the administrators, not the socialists like him, he argued.

Nice scapegoat, these administrators were! All that exonerated Akçam and made him squeaky clean!

As to why “we socialists” never faced up to the criminal acts in Turkish history, Akçam argued that animosity toward the “other” neighborhood was far more important than facing up to criminal acts. “Our culture was such that we [preferred to] blame the Armenians for cooperating with the imperialists while we were fighting our war of independence, and the Dersimians represented a backward and feudal system.”

Then Akçam made his grandstand by calling on “our” neighborhood to face up to its crimes.

In such argumentation Akçam conveniently dismissed the criminality of the Armenian gangs in the massacre of more than a half-million Moslems, the fatal blow that the Armenian rebellion had inflicted on the fighting ability of the Ottoman armies in wartime, and ignored the fact the Dersim episode was instigated by reactionary feudal lords that had conspired against the young Turkish republic.

Akçam also chose not to mention the bloody 1993 Madimak episode in the Anatolian city of Sivas. A crowd of fanatic Islamists (from the “other” neighborhood), amid chants of “Allah-ü Ekber,” set fire to a hotel where a group of left-leaning intellectuals had assembled. In the ensuing mayhem 37 artists and writers lost their lives.

Akçam’s analysis of past events is the hallmark of an academician who follows a one-track, necessarily biased, approach to historical events.

In his call to confront one’s criminal history, Akçam should turn the tables and first ask the Armenians and “other” neighborhood to confront their criminality. Why, for example, are the Armenian archives in Yerevan and Boston closed while all Turkish ones open? What are the Armenians hiding?

And when will the likes of the “Madimak crowd” see the light of Enlightenment?

Summing it up

The Taraf-Birgün episode raised the specter of a history professor who, by the reckoning of his own brother, was long in false accusations but short in scruples and trustworthiness. The episode also caught the professor in contradictions and brought to light his biased, one-track approach to traumatic events in Turkish history in the past 100 years.

Will all this make any difference as regards Akçam’s credibility as a scholar for the Armenian money masters who sponsor his academic career – like the Zoryan Institute and the Cafesjian Family Foundation when Akçam was at the University of Minnesota, and now the Arams, the Kaloosdians and the Mugars at Clark University? Considering that the professor’s criminal past has so far made no difference, the answer must be a firm “no.” Obviously, the professor is serving a useful – in fact very useful – purpose for the Armenian lobby.

It must be a wondrous world when the “golden” Armenian coffers can sustain an academic chair in history when, as in Akçam’s case, the holder of that chair happens to have his degree in sociology.

In fact, we should not be too surprised if the spinmasters of the Armenian lobby call on their “prince charming” to come to the aid of the Armenian mob charged last month with the largest Medicare fraud in U.S. history. Could the professor argue that the mob job was actually the “dirty work” of the Turks? Never say “no.”

To rephrase his brother’s question, in which “neighborhood” does Taner Akçam stand when it comes to truth?

Surely, the professor must be able to answer that question himself without help from his old-time mentor, Professor Vahakn Dadrian.

A deeper question is, why Akçam-the-professor would write in a newspaper such as Taraf which has a reputation of acting as a rogue agent of the government on unsubstantiated allegations relating to the opposition, and whose executive editor, Ahmet Altan, in his own words, would be willing to sell out his country “for a woman’s breast and the shade of a cherry tree.” …. But that would be a different story.

ferruh@demirmen.com

Addendum: The above article was first submitted (as an exception) to “Armenian Genocide Resource Center,” http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com.  Initially, the host welcomed the article and published it as an “exclusive” on its website. Half a day later the post was mysteriously removed from the website. Query as to why it was removed elicited no satisfactory response.

Taner Akçam, Associate Professor of History at Clark University (Worcester, MA) and the “prince charming” of the Armenian lobby, got himself trapped in contradictions on interpreting the results of Turkey’s recent (September 12) referendum on Constitutional changes. He inadvertently brought to surface some unsavory aspects of his past. Akçam’s younger brother, Cahit Akçam, used the occasion to mock the elder brother and charged him with betrayal.

taner akcam

Taner Akçam is an occasional contributor to Turkey’s Taraf, an off-base newspaper that is a staunch supporter of Turkey’s AKP (AK Party, Justice and Development Party). Rumored to be funded by the USA-based Gülen movement, and according to some also by the CIA, it is staffed largely by ex-liberal socialists that are now far to the right. Cahit Akçam is a columnist at Turkey’s left-leaning Birgün newspaper. The AKP is Turkey’s Islamic-rooted ruling party.

What got Taner Akçam into trouble was an op-ed he wrote in Taraf titled “Seeking Milosevic” that attacked Birgün. He took issue with Birgün’s headline news that the referendum had confirmed the 60% right-wing and 40% left-wing split in the country, and that the nationalist conservative votes had consolidated at the AKP. In what was a victory for the AKP, the referendum passed by a margin of 58%.

http://www.birgun.net/actuels_index.php?news_code=1284363022&year=2010&month=09&day=13

http://taraf.com.tr/haber/milosevic-i-aramak.htm

By drawing an analogy between Birgün and Slobodan Milosevic of ex-Yugoslavia, Akçam implicitly accused the newspaper of supporting nationalistic, racist and genocidal sentiments.

Neighborhood concept

Taner Akçam couldn’t accept Birgün’s view that the 40% of the referendum voters, that had voted “no,” were really left-wing. Noting that mass-killer Slobodan Milosevic, while called a communist and a socialist, had done horrible things, he argued that likewise in Turkey those who voted “no” couldn’t be called true socialists. The naysayers were the main opposition party CHP (Republican People’s Party) and the military-bureaucracy faction. The latter had organized and defended military coups in Turkey, he argued.

According to Akçam, labeling these groups “socialists,” as Birgün did, stemmed from a hatred of the AKP. Akçam called the 40% the “bourgeois group.” He maintained that this hatred is best explained through the “neighborhood” metaphor.

In Akçam’s view, Turkey is founded on “our” and “other” neighborhoods. The first neighborhood is one of “city people” that includes bureaucrats, the military, and the like. The CHP and the Ottoman-era İttihat ve Terakki Partisi (Committee of Union and Progress, CUP) are included in this group.

The “other” neighborhood comprises artisans and peasants that have strong religious identities. This neighborhood is now expanding and encroaching on the “city people” neighborhood.

Akçam sees himself in the “city people” neighborhood, which he calls “ours.”

Contradiction and myopia

But by doing so, Akçam fell into a gasping contradiction, because this is also the group that he labeled “bourgeoisie.” How could someone, with a well-known Marxist background, and calling himself a socialist, be part of the bourgeois group? (Separate from his self-confessed connection to the terrorist PKK organization during 1981-84, Akçam escaped from Turkish prison in 1977 after having been convicted of left-wing terrorist activities aimed at, among others, NATO military and American personnel).

Surprisingly enough, Akçam supports the “other” neighborhood – the conservative, Islamic group solidly backed by Taraf. This is because he thinks this group has strong democratic credentials.

It doesn’t take a professor’s prescience to know that such an argument is plain vacuous.

With the AKP in control – political lords of the 60% group – Turkey today is far removed from democracy – the illegal wiretappings, indefinite detentions and imprisonment of the opponents (including 47 journalists) of the government, an atmosphere of fear permeating the country, mandatory religious education, widespread penetration of Gülenist elements in the state apparatus, in particular the police, appalling inequality between men and women, systematic efforts (re: the referendum) to bring the judiciary under the control of the government, parliamentary immunity, etc. None of these inequities seems to bother the professor.

In Turkey today the press is under siege, and by Prime Minister’s own admission, “Those that are impartial [to the AKP] should be eliminated.” There are more detainees in prison than those convicted. Many detained under the so-called “Ergenekon case” don’t even know the exact charges against them.

No scruples, and no loyalty

Akçam’s contradictions and distortions also caught the attention of his younger brother Cahit Akçam. Responding to the elder Akçam in Birgün, Cahit Akçam couldn’t hide his scorn. In a blistering, two-part rebuttal titled “Really, you are the child of which neighborhood?” he chastised his brother, and mockingly called on him to come to his senses. His article started with a quotation (and an admonition) from Anton Chekhov: “Others’ sins do not make you a saint.”

http://www.birgun.net/actuels_index.php?news_code=1285921168&year=2010&month=10&day=01

http://www.birgun.net/actuels_index.php?news_code=1286441094&year=2010&month=10&day=07

Cahit Akçam called the elder Akçam’s “our” vs. “other” neighborhood analysis, with “Marxist-smelling” questions, “light” and meaningless because it was not founded on class distinction. Neither neighborhood as described by Taner embraced the working class. Asking the rhetorical question as to how Taner could overlook the working class, the younger Akçam thought that his brother, in what appeared to be sheer hypocrisy, didn’t really care for the working class.

Continued the younger brother sarcastically: “Luckily, Taner at least didn’t ignore the bourgeois class in ‘our’ neighborhood.” He chaffed at his brother for not mentioning the bourgeois class in the “other” neighborhood, i.e., the Islamist businessmen that the Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan had braggingly called “The Anatolian Tigers.”

Wondering how his brother could not know that the bourgeois class cannot exist without a working class, Cahit mocked his brother: “He is a big professor. True, not a sociology professor, but a history professor nonetheless. He has licked and swallowed a thousand times more than we have. He knows that, to be so ignorant, one does not have to be a professor. For Taner, the working class has little value.”

The elder Akçam was tersely reminded of the struggles of Turkey’s working class since 1900.

Cahit continued his criticism by making reference to a Turkish metaphor – referring to lentil meal – that this is all that the Taner could muster as an argument. Referring to Taner’s claim that all the “infamous” events in Turkey’s history emanated from “our” class, he bristled at Taner’s suggestion that the socialists, through the CHP, were like relatives to the military- bureaucracy.

He mockingly called attention to the fact that the socialists had suffered immensely from the 1980 fascistic military coup.

Recalling how the elder Akçam had defended the causes of right-wing, fascist elements in Turkey’s recent history, how he had failed to come to the defense of socialists who had been falsely accused of coup attempts, his denialist past, and how he had let down even his own family, the younger Akçam weighed in angrily: “How can Taner accuse his old friends, and even his own brother, as potential perpetrators of genocide?”

Barely concealing his disdain, Cahit asked of his brother: “As you place the blame on your own neighborhood, can there be a more harrowing psychological ruin [for you]?  … Where is your heart, and your conscience?”

The ultimate indignity came when the younger Akçam concluded that only someone who was politically and ideologically blind, and someone who had lost his scruples and his sense of loyalty, could do what his brother had done.

In the background of such emotional outburst was the fact that, while Taner Akçam jumped the prison in 1977 into the safety of Germany and escaped the tribulations of the 1980 military coup, in the coup’s aftermath his brother was put on trial for unauthorized activities, faced death by hanging, and was imprisoned for 8 years. Obviously, a lecture on fascism and the struggles of socialists was the last thing the younger Akçam wanted to hear from a sibling he considered unscruppled and untrustworthy.

A revisionist professor

There was more to Akçam’s false accusations. He twisted history and put finger on “our neighborhood’ as the perpetrator of the May 27 (1960), March 12 (1971) and – obliquely – September 12 (1980) military interventions in Turkey. Evidently to hide his own past, and the embarrassment therewith, in his accounting he glossed over the 1980 military coup and the events (including his role) that preceded it.

He dallied further into the past and noted that his “neighborhood” was also responsible for the so-called “Armenian genocide” and the Dersim events (1937).

But he was quick to disown any blame – a point that also drew ridicule from the younger Akçam. Instead, Taner Akçam conveniently placed the blame on “our administrators.” Socialists like him, while closely affiliated with the administrators, had deep disagreements with them. It was all the fault of the administrators, not the socialists like him, he argued.

Nice scapegoat, these administrators were! All that exonerated Akçam and made him squeaky clean!

As to why “we socialists” never faced up to the criminal acts in Turkish history, Akçam argued that animosity toward the “other” neighborhood was far more important than facing up to criminal acts. “Our culture was such that we [preferred to] blame the Armenians for cooperating with the imperialists while we were fighting our war of independence, and the Dersimians represented a backward and feudal system.”

Then Akçam made his grandstand by calling on “our” neighborhood to face up to its crimes.

In such argumentation Akçam conveniently dismissed the criminality of the Armenian gangs in the massacre of more than a half-million Moslems, the fatal blow that the Armenian rebellion had inflicted on the fighting ability of the Ottoman armies in wartime, and ignored the fact the Dersim episode was instigated by reactionary feudal lords that had conspired against the young Turkish republic.

Akçam also chose not to mention the bloody 1993 Madimak episode in the Anatolian city of Sivas. A crowd of fanatic Islamists (from the “other” neighborhood), amid chants of “Allah-ü Ekber,” set fire to a hotel where a group of left-leaning intellectuals had assembled. In the ensuing mayhem 37 artists and writers lost their lives.

Akçam’s analysis of past events is the hallmark of an academician who follows a one-track, necessarily biased, approach to historical events.

In his call to confront one’s criminal history, Akçam should turn the tables and first ask the Armenians and “other” neighborhood to confront their criminality. Why, for example, are the Armenian archives in Yerevan and Boston closed while all Turkish ones open? What are the Armenians hiding?

And when will the likes of the “Madimak crowd” see the light of Enlightenment?

Summing it up

The Taraf-Birgün episode raised the specter of a history professor who, by the reckoning of his own brother, was long in false accusations but short in scruples and trustworthiness. The episode also caught the professor in contradictions and brought to light his biased, one-track approach to traumatic events in Turkish history in the past 100 years.

Will all this make any difference as regards Akçam’s credibility as a scholar for the Armenian money masters who sponsor his academic career – like the Zoryan Institute and the Cafesjian Family Foundation when Akçam was at the University of Minnesota, and now the Arams, the Kaloosdians and the Mugars at Clark University? Considering that the professor’s criminal past has so far made no difference, the answer must be a firm “no.” Obviously, the professor is serving a useful – in fact very useful – purpose for the Armenian lobby.

It must be a wondrous world when the “golden” Armenian coffers can sustain an academic chair in history when, as in Akçam’s case, the holder of that chair happens to have his degree in sociology.

In fact, we should not be too surprised if the spinmasters of the Armenian lobby call on their “prince charming” to come to the aid of the Armenian mob charged last month with the largest Medicare fraud in U.S. history. Could the professor argue that the mob job was actually the “dirty work” of the Turks? Never say “no.”

To rephrase his brother’s question, in which “neighborhood” does Taner Akçam stand when it comes to truth?

Surely, the professor must be able to answer that question himself without help from his old-time mentor, Professor Vahakn Dadrian.

A deeper question is, why Akçam-the-professor would write in a newspaper such as Taraf which has a reputation of acting as a rogue agent of the government on unsubstantiated allegations relating to the opposition, and whose executive editor, Ahmet Altan, in his own words, would be willing to sell out his country “for a woman’s breast and the shade of a cherry tree.” …. But that would be a different story.

ferruh@demirmen.com

Addendum: The above article was first submitted (as an exception) to “Armenian Genocide Resource Center,” http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com.  Initially, the host welcomed the article and published it as an “exclusive” on its website. Half a day later the post was mysteriously removed from the website. Query as to why it was removed elicited no satisfactory response.

Türksam, December 9, 2009

(Turkish Center for International Relations & Strategic Analysis)

http://www.turksam.org/en/a253.html

A misconceived engagement with Armenia has boomeranged beyond diplomacy to impact Turkey’s energy policy. The developments so far are already worrying, and further negative consequences may follow. Turkey’s energy policy is held hostage, and the culprit is a short-sighted Armenia rapprochement that has ignored Azerbaijan’s legitimate concerns on Nagorno-Karabakh.

While some may view the energy “fallout” as a case of “unintended consequences” for Turkey,  the effects could have been foreseen easily.

Background

The secret, Switzerland-based Turkish-Armenian normalization process that surfaced in April 2009 in the aftermath of President Obama’s visit to Turkey, albeit launched with good intentions, turned out to be a disappointment for the Turkish side. The “road map” that was announced had a glaring omission: trustworthy preconditions or commitments requisite for normalization of bilateral relations.

In particular, there was no assurance that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, vital for Azerbaijan, would be resolved before opening the Turkey-Armenia border. Baku was concerned, and Turkish-Azerbaijani relations soured.

The two Turkish-Armenian protocols later initialed on August 31 and signed on October 10 confirmed the absence of any caveat on Nagorno-Karabakh, and further alienated Azerbaijan.

For the better part of 2009 Turkey has been trying to placate Azerbaijan, with promises that it will not open the Turkey-Armenia border unless the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is first resolved.

The promise is like a double-edged sword. If Turkey reneges on its promise to Azerbaijan, Turkish-Azerbaijani relations will receive a serious, possibly fatal blow. If Turkey keeps its promise, and Turkish-Armenian normalization fails as a result, Turkey will be criticized in the West for being insincere or manipulative on Armenia “opening.” Armenian “genocide” allegations in the US Congress will come to the forefront again. April 24, 2010 is not too far ahead.

In either case, unless the Armenian parliament refuses to ratify the normalization protocols before the Turkish parliament does, Turkey will be the loser.

That will be the price paid for an ill-conceived political process. Armenia has made it clear repeatedly that it sees no linkage between the normalization process and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. So, Turkey is facing a major quandary.

At present, neither Turkey nor Armenia has submitted the protocols to their respective parliaments for ratification. The fate of the normalization process will hang heavily on the actions of the two parliaments. But for Turkey, and the West in general, some energy projects are at stake.

The fallout on energy

From energy point of view, worsening Turkish-Azerbaijani relations, if not stemmed, will come at a heavy price for Turkey. Alarmed at the Turkish-Armenian normalization talks conducted behind his back, an angry and resentful Ilham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan, announced in May that, if forced, Azerbaijan would resort to military force to recapture the Azeri Nagorno-Karabakh territory it lost to Armenia in 1994. (See also recent analysis, ref. 1)

Aliyev had the sympathy of Turkey and a host of other nations and several UN resolutions to back him up, but that was not enough. Peace talks mediated by the OSCE Minsk Group were also not producing palpable results. (Armenian-Azeri talks in Munich in late November were also inconclusive, ref. 1).

To give credibility to his warning, or threat, Aliyev decided to play the gas card as a strategic tool. Partnership with Russia, at least on energy initially, was the strategy he had in mind. And Russia, given the opportunity to exploit the South Caucuses conflict, was more than willing to appear cooperative.

The gas card Aliyev was mulling over was the Shah Deniz gas lying below the bed of the Caspian Sea. Aliyev was already unhappy over the prolonged, yet unresolved, dispute with Turkey over the price of Shah Deniz-1 gas that Turkey had been importing since July 2007. The price of gas was up for negotiation in April 2008, but discussions had reached a deadlock. Aliyev complained that Turkey was paying, at $120/1000 m3, one-third of the market price for gas, and Turkey’s counter offers were not high enough.

On June 29, Russia’s Gazprom and Azerbaijan’s state-owned company Socor signed a gas agreement in Baku in the presence of respective presidents. The agreement stipulated that, starting in 2010, Gazprom would buy Azeri gaz, including, apparently, Shah Deniz-2 gas when it becomes available (currently in 2015). This would be the first time in Azerbaijan’s history that Azeri gas would be exported to Russia.

The gas volume initially involved was small (annually 500 million m3), but it was announced that the volume would increase in future. Gazprom would have the right of first refusal on additional supplies of gas when available. The agreement paved the way for a broad Russian-Azerbaijani cooperation that could possibly extend beyond gas.

The June 29 deal received further endorsement in Baku on October 14.

The Russian-Azerbaijani accord was a clear message to Turkey, and the West in general, from Aliyev that Azerbaijan would keep its options open as far as exporting its gas from the planned Shah Deniz Phase-2 development. This cast doubt not only on future Shah Deniz-2 gas supplies to Turkey, but also on Azeri gas supplies to the planned west-bound Nabucco project that Turkey had boastfully committed itself to in Ankara on July 13 (ref. 2).

To export its gas, Azerbaijan is now pursuing other options that circumvent Turkish territory: a subsea line in the Black Sea running from Georgia to Romania (White Stream project), tanker transport of compressed gas from Georgia to Bulgaria, and a swap or direct gas sale deal with Iran. Preliminary agreements have been signed on all of these. The existing pipeline connections with Iran and Russia would facilitate Russia and Iran options.

Broader implications

Turkey’s ill-founded Armenia engagement process, lacking any meaningful preconditions, is derailing Turkey’s energy policy. A distrustful Azerbaijan has now moved closer to Russia, and Shah Deniz-2 gas exports to Turkey for its domestic needs, as well as for onward transit to Europe via the planned Nabucco pipeline, are put in jeopardy.

Import of Turkmen gas via a future Trans-Caspian pipeline, that could also feed the Nabucco pipeline, is also at risk. For Turkmen gas to reach Turkey via the Trans-Caspian pipeline, Azerbaijan’s cooperation is essential.

Turkey needs Azeri gas in excess of the currently imported Shah Deniz-1 gas to diversify its gas supply sources and routes. Currently there is excessive (some 60%) dependence on Russian gas supplies for Turkey’s domestic needs.

Despite its shortcomings, Nabucco project is still a vital project for Turkey both from energy and political point of view (ref. 2). If Nabucco does not receive throughput from Azeri or Turkmen sources, Turkey’s long-avowed strategic position as an energy corridor to the West will be seriously compromised.

Public outcry stemming from alienation from the brotherly Azeri nation is also a price that Turkish policy makers must consider.

The above considerations leave no doubt that the Ankara-Baku rift should be mended. The sooner the better. The onus of this burden rests mainly on Turkey, not Azerbaijan. Otherwise Azerbaijan will move even closer to Russia, and Turkey may have to do without new Azeri (Shah Deniz-2) gas supplies. That would be rather unfortunate.

While it would entail a higher cost, Azerbaijan has options to export its gas without transiting Turkish territory.

Aliyev has indicated a number of times that Azerbaijan is interested in the Nabucco project, but unless Turkey is more accommodating, that interest may go nowhere.

All indications are that Turkey has overplayed its hand as far as its geographic position as an energy conduit, and has also stonewalled too long to meet reasonable Azeri requests for a gas price that closely reflects market conditions.

Turkey should not be seen as being obstructionist for the implementation of the Nabucco project. In this connection, the possible ramifications of Turkey’s support for the rival South Stream project during the August 6 Russia-Turkey-Italy energy summit in Ankara were not lost on the EU, and may dampen the EU’s interest in Nabucco.

It is telling that Austrian OMV (the flag-bearer for Nabucco), Italian ENI and French EDF have signed preliminary agreements with Gazprom recently about joint implementation of the South Stream project. In the light of these developments, one wonders whether the EU’s support for Nabucco is as good as before, and whether Turkey’s apparent wavering on Nabucco is playing a role. The financing problem of Nabucco is also at a standstill.

Another fallout from strained Turkish-Azerbaijani relations could be the curtailment of the BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) throughput, with some of the crude diverted to the Russian and Georgian ports of Novorossiysk and Supsa, respectively. Lukoil, ExxonMobil and Devon, shareholders of AIOC (Azerbaijan International Oil Company) but not the BTC consortium, are already using these routes to export their entitlements from the ACG (Azeri-Chirag-Gunesli) field in Azerbaijan.

Export of Kazakh crude through the BTC could also be delayed or blocked. An ominous sign in this respect comes from the Russian-Kazakh oil transit agreement signed in Yalta on November 20. The agreement signaled support for the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline, which Russia, at Turkey’s strong urging, recently endorsed. Samsun-Ceyhan will undermine plans to export Kazakh oil through a trans-Caspian pipeline link to the BTC.

An irony for the US

As a footnote to the above, it is also worth observing an irony in Turkey’s “opening” to Armenia. It is no secret that US pressure, in particular the urging of President Obama in person, played a key role in launching the Armenia engagement process. Yet, the process has not only damaged the close Turkish-Azerbaijani partnership, it has drawn Azerbaijan into Russia’s orbit of influence. This runs counter to the long-established US policy of weaning Soviet-era Turkic republics from Russia’s sphere of influence, in particular on energy.

The maxim, “unintended consequences,”  describes this situation well for the US.

Concluding remarks

An ill-conceived political normalization process undertaken with Armenia has pushed a nervous Azerbaijan closer to Russia and has driven this small nation to seek alternative gas export options that circumvent Turkish territory. Future Azeri, and in the longer term Turkmen, gas imports to Turkey are jeopardized.

Some of the throughput to the BTC may be diverted, and plans to channel Kazakh oil to the BTC may be cancelled or postponed indefinitely.

In parallel, Turkey’s role to act as an energy corridor to the West is compromised.

The energy projects impacted are all important for Turkey. If for no other reason than to safeguard these projects, it is vitally important that the Turkish-Azerbaijani relations are put back where they belong, and where they traditionally have been: good, friendly terms.

Despite rosy statements from Turkish government circles, Turkish-Azeri relations are severely strained. Rapprochement with Armenia should not come at the expense of brotherly relations with Azerbaijan.

Turkish policy makers who now claim the Turkey-Armenia border would not be opened until the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is resolved, should answer the question: If that were to be so, why did the normalization protocols signed with Armenia not contain the requisite precondition in the first place? It is no secret that the Armenia engagement started under external pressures, both from the US and the EU.

The adverse energy-related effects stemming from the ill-conceived Armenia normalization process were no surprise, and could have been foreseen in advance.

Those who are entrusted to lead the nation should be cognizant of the fact that one-sided foreign-policy initiatives that are launched without due consideration of underlying risks can have boomerang effects that may undermine national energy interests.

If the rift in energy cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan deepens, in a sense it will be a betrayal of the legacy of the late Azerbaijani President Haydar Aliyev, who, with resolute determination, championed the realization of the BTC project despite many roadblocks. Turkey will bear the lion’s share of responsibility for this state of affairs.

Separate from the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, the Armenia normalization process has ignored other legitimate concerns that are important for Turkey (ref. 3).

 A far-sighted national energy policy requires vision, foresight and perseverance. Whether Turkey’s policy makers have these traits, the readers should ponder.

 References cited

(1)   “Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations in Munich and the possibility of war,” by Sinan Oğan, Türksam, Nov. 23, 2009.

(2)   “Nabucco: A challenge for EU and a partially fulfilled promise for Turkey,” by Ferruh Demirmen, Eurasia Critic, September 2009.

(3)   “Current Turkish ‘opening’ to Armenia cannot be supported,” by Ferruh Demirmen, Turkish Forum, October 9, 2009.

ferruh@demirmen.com

After the signing of Turkish-Armenian normalization protocols in Zurich on October 10, the Washington-based ATAA (Assembly of Turkish American Associations) issued an analysis of the protocols to clarify the reasons for its earlier endorsement of the normalization process. The announcement was issued by President Gunay Evinch.

Relying on the language in the protocols that refer to “territorial integrity,” “inviolability of frontiers,” “foreign sovereignty,” “refrain from the use of force,” and “recognition of the existing border,” the ATAA analysis draws the conclusion that, once the protocols take effect, Armenia would no longer have territorial claims against Turkey.

It further infers that Armenia would withdraw from the occupied Azeri territory of Nagorno-Karabagh, account for its human violations in the territory, and allow the return of over one million Azeri refugees.

Based on another clause that condemns terrorism, it is argued that ASALA-type terrorism and other acts of violence against Turks and Turkish interests would henceforth come to an end.

ATAA believes that the establishment of historical commission as envisioned in the protocols would prevent US Congressional resolutions on genocide allegations.

After making cross linkages between several clauses, the ATAA analysis further concludes, in a quasi-legal manner, that the opening of the common border between Turkey and Armenia should logically lead to the realization of goals embraced by the Turkish side noted above.

But the ATAA’s analysis is far from convincing. The conclusions reached are not based on any concrete steps that the protocols call for Armenia to implement. Rather, the analysis relies on the goodwill of Armenia, on expectations that a well-intentioned Armenia would deliver.

And herein lies the problem: counting on the sincerity and goodwill of Armenia. Considering Armenia’s past hostility toward Turkey, the instruments contained in its Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, and the Armenian officials’ public pronouncements, e.g., on the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict and genocide allegations, prior to the signing of the protocols, it is naive to rely on the goodwill of Armenia.

The fact that the Armenian side objected to Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s prepared statement to be delivered after the signing of the protocols in Zurich, says much about the supposed goodwill of Armenia. Without naming the conflict, Davutoğlu was going to make only an indirect reference to the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, expressing the hope that the signing of protocols would lead to the resolution of the conflict. The Armenian side demurred, arguing behind doors that the statement would unnecessarily draw linkage between the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict and the normalization process.

So much about good intentions!

Judging from the language in the protocols, there are also serious reservations as to the usefulness of a historical commission to resolve, once and for all, the thorny issue of genocide allegations.(1)

If Armenia is to be believed in its good intentions, the protocols would contain unambiguous clauses as to the steps Armenia would take, e.g., amend its Constitution, withdraw from Nagorno-Karabagh, in return for the opening of the border. The protocols contain no such quid pro quo.

In contrast, the language in the protocols on the opening of the common border is clear and unmistakable: Once the protocols are ratified, the common border would be opened within two months.

The open border, of course, would overwhelmingly benefit Armenia.

For all it cares, Armenia can easily stonewall for years the implementation of steps it is expected to take, prevaricating on its acts, while in the meantime the Turkey-Armenia border remains open. It can maintain, for example, that it is not making (overt) territorial claims on Turkey while at the same time refusing to amend its Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, or change the design of its national flag.

Or it can claim it is not actively pursuing “genocide” claims while winking at, and even secretly encouraging, genocide recognition efforts by the Armenian diaspora.

Or it can make a cosmetic withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabagh, arguing that it has fulfilled its obligations as far as “promoting peace in the region.”

And should Turkey contemplate re-closing the border because Armenia has not “delivered,” volleys of criticism from the American and European sympathizers of Armenia would surely follow.

Further, should the Turkish Parliament refuse to ratify the protocols for lack of progress on the Nagorno-Karabagh issue, as Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan has inexplicably suggested recently, Turkey would surely be singled out for having bad faith in the Turkish-Armenian normalization process.

(Diplomatically, Erdoğan’s suggestion is a major faux pas, because there is no linkage in the protocols between the Nagorno-Karabagh issue and the normalization process. After giving repeated assurances to the Azeris on Nagorno-Karabagh, yet without any backing from the protocols, the PM has forced himself into a corner. Now he is expecting the Turkish Parliament to bail him out).

In conclusion, ATAA’s analysis, no doubt reflecting an idealistic outlook, is based on presumptive logic, or wishful thinking, and cannot be supported. ATAA says the normalization protocols are based on the concept of “constructive ambiguity” by which each side interprets the language as it sees fit. This is an interesting approach, but offers no comfort for the Turkish side – or, for that matter, the Azeri side.

ATAA should ponder: Would it ever sign a binding contract based pre-eminently on “constructive ambiguity,” wherein the only expressed certainty is for the advantage of the other side, but everything else is predicated on goodwill?

Nations signing intergovernmental agreements should be held to the same standards of credibility and accountability as persons who conclude private or business transactions.

ATAA issued its analysis on behalf of its Board of Directors. But ATAA also claimed in its announcement that it spoke on behalf of the Turkish-American community. A relevant question is: Has ATAA polled its members on the issue?

It is worth noting that almost all opposition parties in Turkey, certainly the major ones, are opposed to the Turkish-Armenian normalization process in its present form. They remember what happened in Cyprus.

(1) Current Turkish “opening” to Armenia cannot be supported: by Ferruh Demirmen, “Turkish Forum,” October 9, 2009.

ferruh@demirmen.com

Note to Turkish Forum readers: On October 10, the Azeri news outlet Trend News (http://en.trend.az)/ published on its website excerpts from my article cited above. The excerpted article, “Normalization of Ankara -Yerevan relations cannot be supported: Turkish expert,” was also published on the same day in Turkish Forum. The article contained a photo, purportedly depicting me. Turkish Forum readers are advised that the person depicted in that photo is not me. F. Demirmen.

The process of normalizing the Ankara -Yerevan relations, developed on the incorrect basis, cannot be supported, Energy Expert Ferruh Demirmen told the Turkish Forum website.

The protocols give no assurance or confidence that Armenia will take steps expected with normalization. The indications are that the Turkish government has forced itself into a predicament, possibly even a trap, of its own making, Demirmen said.

Earlier Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan told Trend News in an exclusive interview that Turkey and Armenia will sign a deal to establish diplomatic ties on Oct. 10 or 11.

Three major Turkish-American umbrella organizations, the Assembly of Turkish American Associations (ATAA), Turkish Coalition of America (TCA), and the Federation of Turkish American Associations (FTAA) have supported the normalization process. They considered this step as a step towards regional peace and as a blow to the Armenian diaspora, making it ineffective in its lobbying efforts against Turkey, the Turkish Forum wrote.

However Demirmen believes, the normalization process, in its present form, is ill-founded, ill-advised, and cannot be supported from the Turkish point of view. The arguments advanced for normalization, while sounding reasonable, and in principle commendable, represent to a large extent wishful thinking for the Turkish side, not backed by the two diplomatic protocols announced by Turkey and Armenia

No caveat or pre-conditions are attached to normalization and the opening of the common border,” the expert said. Given that the opening of the border will overwhelmingly benefit Armenia, the protocols call for no concessions from Armenia, Demirmen added.

Genocide allegations and the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict are the chief thorny issues between the two countries; but for Turkey, Armenia’s hitherto hostile behavior is also a cause for deep resentment, the Turkish expert added.

On the genocide issue, the protocols call for the establishment of a bilateral commission to study “the historical dimension with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations, including … an examination of the historical records and archives to define existing problems and formulate recommendations.” There is no mention to specifically address the genocide issue, whether it happened or not, Demirmen said.

This work may continue for years, during which time the border will remain open. Because, the Armenians diaspora would continue to insist on recognizing the genocide, Demirmen wrote.

There are also reports from Armenian sources that the Armenian government will insist that the historical commission should focus not on whether “genocide” occurred – because this is a given “fact” – but rather, how it occurred.

In a recent interview with the Armenian Reporter in New York, Armenian President Serzh Sargisyan noted that Armenia and the diaspora are “one family,” and that recognition of “genocide” is a “long-awaited victory for justice.”

A clear message, but not a helpful one for normalizing relations, Demirmen believes.

The language in the protocols on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue is even fuzzier. Other than a “commitment to the peaceful settlement of regional and international disputes,” the protocols contain no concrete reference to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. There is no mention of ending the illegal occupation of the Azeri territory by Armenia – notwithstanding the UN resolutions – of the innocent Azerbaijani civilians that fell victim to ethnic cleansing by Armenian forces, and of the plight of one million Azerbaijani refugees, Demirmen noted.

The author also noted that on a recent visit to Moscow, the Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian stated that the Nagorno-Karabakh issue never entered into negotiations with Turkey, and never will.

In any case, while the Nagorno-Karabakh issue drags on in negotiations, the Turkey-Armenia border will remain open, the expert believes.

Normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations without the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will be a “sellout” by Turkey of brotherly Azerbaijan, and a betrayal of Azeri nation’s trust in Turkey.

The chief fallout from a rift in Azerbaijani-Turkish relations will be energy projects – including Shah Deniz II gas supply for the Nabucco project. Throughput to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) crude pipeline may also be curtailed, the expert added.

Source: en.trend.az, 10.10.2009

The Turkey-Armenia normalization process, due to take effect soon, in its present form carry imponderables that raise serious questions as to its merits for Turkey.

Three major Turkish-American umbrella organizations, the Assembly of Turkish American Associations (ATAA), Turkish Coalition of America (TCA), and the Federation of Turkish American Associations (FTAA), regrettably issued statements recently in support of the normalization process.

In their endorsement, ATAA and TCA stressed, as has the Turkish government, the importance of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia in pursuit of regional peace, while FTAA, being more prophetic, argued that the process would be a blow to the Armenian diaspora, making it ineffective in its lobbying efforts against Turkey.

There is, however, fierce opposition to the normalization process both in Turkey and Armenia.

No pre-conditions

The normalization process, in its present form, is ill-founded, ill-advised, and cannot be supported from the Turkish point of view. The arguments advanced for normalization, while sounding reasonable, and in principle commendable, represent to a large extent wishful thinking for the Turkish side, not backed by the two diplomatic protocols announced by Turkey and Armenia. The protocols, initialed on August 31 and due to be signed on October 10, form the blueprint for the normalization process.

Reading through the protocols, the one thing that is striking is the generality of the language and the lack of concrete steps to be taken to resolve the outstanding issues between Turkey and Armenia. No caveat or pre-conditions are attached to normalization and the opening of the common border.

Given that the opening of the border will overwhelmingly benefit Armenia, the protocols call for no concessions from Armenia.

Genocide allegations and the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict are the chief thorny issues between the two countries; but for Turkey, Armenia’s hitherto hostile behavior is also a cause for deep resentment.

Genocide issue

On the genocide issue, the protocols call for the establishment of a bilateral commission to study “the historical dimension with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations, including … an examination of the historical records and archives to define existing problems and formulate recommendations.” There is no mention to specifically address the genocide issue, whether it happened or not.

Nor is there any commitment to open Armenian archives for examination. Turkish archives are already open.

Likewise, the time frame for the completion of the commission’s work is left open. This work may continue for years, during which time the border will remain open.

Swiss and other international experts will be joining Armenian and Turkish experts, and herein lies a potential trap for Turkey – considering how the West is already biased against the Turkish position. Switzerland is one country where denial of “Armenian genocide” is punishable by law. France is another one.

Furthermore, assuming that the commission will reach a well-defined conclusion, there is no commitment on the part of Armenia that it would abide by this conclusion, or that it would try to dissuade the diaspora Armenians from continuing the genocide rhetoric.

In its August 23, 1990 Declaration of Independence, Armenia stated that it will continue supporting international recognition of “the 1915 genocide,” and has done so ever since.

It is probable that the Armenian diaspora will press for genocide recognition with undiminished fervor, with implicit if not explicit support of Armenia, regardless of the conclusions reached by the historical commission. The Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA), the chief lobbying arm of the diaspora in America, is firmly against the Turkish-Armenian protocols. The Armenian-American community, in general, is also opposed.

With the diaspora’s anti-Turkish lobbying efforts continuing in full force, Armenia can, as a last resort, “wash its hands off,” arguing that it has no “control” on the diaspora.

There are also reports from Armenian sources that the Armenian government will insist that the historical commission should focus not on whether “genocide” occurred – because this is a given “fact” – but rather, how it occurred.

In a recent interview with the Armenian Reporter in New York, Armenian President Serge Sargsian noted that Armenia and the diaspora are “one family,” and that  recognition of “genocide” is a “long-awaited victory for justice.”

A clear message, but not a helpful one for normalizing relations.

So, how is the establishment of the historical commission as foreseen in the protocols really make a difference as far as genocide allegations? A check of reality is in order here.

Nagorno-Karabagh conflict

The language in the protocols on the Nagorno-Karabagh issue is even fuzzier. Other than a “commitment to the peaceful settlement of regional and international disputes,” the protocols contain no concrete reference to the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict. There is no mention of ending the illegal occupation of the Azeri territory by Armenia – notwithstanding the UN resolutions – of the innocent Azeri civilians that fell victim to ethnic cleansing by Armenian forces, and of the plight of one million Azeri refugees.

On a recent visit to Moscow, the Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian stated that the Nagorno-Karabagh issue never entered into negotiations with Turkey, and never will.

Still, as part of the normalization process, Armenia may implement a cosmetic withdrawal from the occupied territory, but this will fall well short of the UN demands, and will not in any way satisfy Azerbaijan. The Minsk Group has been ineffective to date.

In any case, while the Nagorno-Karabagh issue drags on in negotiations, the Turkey-Armenia border will remain open.

Occupation of Nagorno-Karabagh by Armenian forces was the reason Turkey closed the Turkey-Armenia border in 1993.

Normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations without the solution of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict will be a “sellout” by Turkey of brotherly Azerbaijan, and a betrayal of Azeri nation’s trust in Turkey.

Other than trust, the chief fallout from a rift in Azeri-Turkish relations will be energy projects – including Shah Deniz II gas supply for the Nabucco project. Throughput to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) crude pipeline may also be curtailed, and the Kazakh oil reaching Baku (due to increase following recent agreement between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan) across the Caspian Sea, instead of the BTC outlet, will likely be exported from the Black Sea ports of Supsa (Georgia) or Novorossiysk (Russia).

Economics aside, that will increase oil tanker traffic through the Bosporus.

Should these eventualities materialize, Turkish politicians, or rather the AKP leaders, will have a lot in their hands to “explain.”

Other issues

Other thorny issues between Turkey and Armenia include refusal of Armenia to recognize the 1921 Kars Agreement (signed between Turkey and the three neighboring Soviet Republics defining the borders), reference to Mount Ararat as a national symbol in Armenia’s Constitution, inclusion of the Mount Ararat insignia on Armenia’s national flag, and reference to eastern Turkey as “Western Armenia” in the Armenian Declaration of Independence.

Such stance on the part of Armenia is an antithesis of good intentions towards a neighbor. Yet, apart from a veiled reference to the Kars Agreement, the issue is largely ignored in the Turkish-Armenian protocols.

How could a country like Turkey normalize relations with a neighbor when the latter signals territorial claims on its neighbor – and does not want to alter its mind-set?

Could the U.S. have a normal diplomatic relation with Mexico if the latter claimed in its Constitution that the southwest U.S. is part of a larger Mexico?

Lingering in the background, of course, is the nefarious ASALA terror that caused the death of more than 40 Turkish diplomats in various countries in the 1970’s and ‘80’s.

Armenia cannot be directly blamed for ASALA’s terror, but the Armenian officials have not publically condemned the dastardly acts of ASALA.

Memories are still fresh on Armenian president Andranik Makarian’s warm welcome extended to the ASALA terrorist Varadian Garabedian when the latter was released from French prison in 2001. The Yerevan mayor Rober Nazarian gave the terrorist assurance that he would be given food, shelter and a job in Yerevan. In fact, Garabedian received a hero’s welcome when he stepped into Armenian soil. He had been convicted in France of the 1983 bombing of the Turkish Airlines bureau at the Paris-Orly airport, killing 8 people and wounding 61.

Call for judgment

The notion of normalizing relations between Turkey and Armenia is applaudable. Peace and political stability in the region require such normalization, and no reasonable person can oppose this process. Normalization, however, should be predicated on the ending of all hostile elements in the relations between the two countries.

Other than closing the border in 1993, Turkey has not nurtured any adversarial notions towards Armenia. Countless Turkish citizens of Armenian origin, with their churches, hospitals, charities, etc. live peacefully in Turkey, enjoying the full rights of any Turkish citizen, including the right to vote, while at the same time the presence of some 70,000 illegal Armenian workers in Turkey is tolerated.

No Armenian flags are publically burned or trampled upon on national holidays in Turkey, and children are not indoctrinated with anti-Armenian sentiments – in families, schools or mosques – from day one of reaching their consciousness.

The despicable murder of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink – by unknown forces still under investigation – in January 2007 in Istanbul was widely condemned in Turkey, many Turks taking to the streets chanting “We are all Armenians,” or “We are all Hrant Dink.”

Compare these realities with those in Armenia, and the Armenian diaspora, and what a stark, depressing contrast emerges! One would be hard put, for example, to find a single functioning mosque in Armenia.

And no president of a Turkish-American organization was charged with and convicted of terror activities, like the ex-ANCA president Murat Topalian, who received, in 2001, a 3-year prison sentence in Ohio court for his involvement in a bomb attack against the Turkish House in New York in 1981.

Notwithstanding some gross exaggerations, e.g., 1.5 million purported deaths, Armenians have a genuine sorrowful history to tell going back to World War I, and they want Turkey to account for the sad history. But Turks also have a painful, traumatic history, with 2.5 million Moslems (Turks and Kurds) contemporaneously perished in Anatolia, some half a million at the hands of renegade Armenian bands that joined the invading Russian and French forces, hitting the Ottoman forces from behind.

Wartime tragedies are like the two sides of a coin, and if Armenia insists on accounting of history, it must also show empathy for the other side and face the excesses of its own history.

That is why, it is essential that the historical commission that is envisioned in the protocols have access to all archival documents, Armenian and Turkish included, and the commission’s purview should be making a comprehensive review of the World War I events in their entirety.

Turkey is prepared to face its history. Is Armenia prepared to face its own?

Christian sympathies for the Armenian claims should not ignore or overlook tragedies visited on the Moslems.

Wrap-up

Wrapping up, reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia in principle is commendable, and in fact, long overdue. But such a process must first remove hostile attitudes that exist between the two countries. Because the animus, or an attitude of hostility, has been very largely on the Armenian side, Armenia must first change its attitude toward Turkey, e.g., by revising its Constitution.

An expression of sorrow on the ASALA terror would be also helpful.

The two Turkish-Armenian protocols, however, give no assurance or confidence that Armenia will take these steps. Based on ambiguous, noncommittal language in the protocols, one can only hope for a positive change on the Armenian side.

But hope is not sufficient. There should be greater certitude in the protocols as to how Armenia will alter its conduct.

The only certain clause in the protocols is the one that calls for the opening of the Turkey-Armenia border within 2 months after the protocols take force. There is little doubt that the land-locked Armenia, with most of its population living in poverty, will reap major economic gains from the free-trade opportunities afforded by a re-opened border.

Once the border is opened, it will be virtually impossible to reverse the process regardless of how Armenia behaves. Closure of the border would draw harsh criticism from the U.S. and the EU.

The Turkish-Armenian protocols, devoid of any pre-conditions, are being pushed by Turkey’s AKP government at the strong urging of the U.S., in particular President Obama in person. The EU is also pressuring Turkey. By signing these protocols, the government hopes to earn “brownie points” from the U.S. and the EU in an effort to further advance its Islamic political agenda.

This is regrettable. While the issue is one of political convenience for the AKP government, it is essentially a matter of national dignity for Turkey.

A fundamental question that the government must explain is, other than “brownie points,” what it will actually gain from the signing of the two protocols. If the purpose is to deflect the Obama administration from recognizing Armenian “genocide” – as President Obama said he would during the election campaign – it is a black mark for the Turkish foreign policy. It would be caving in to what is effectively a blackmail.

When he visited Turkey in April, Obama inveighed that he had not changed his “thinking” on genocide allegations. The implication – a veiled threat – was not lost on Turks.

Another key question is, if the protocols are ratified by the Turkish Parliament and they become binding, how the government will handle the Azeris’ certain displeasure. Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly assured the Azeris that he will not disappoint them. Yet, the protocols give little hope of a diplomatic breakthrough in the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict.

Perhaps the government is hoping secretly that the Parliament will decline to ratify the protocols, letting the PM effectively “off the hook.” That eventuality, of course, will trigger another headache. Parliamentary ratification is a Constitutional requirement in Turkey. The Parliament, however, cannot make any alterations to the protocols. It can only ratify or reject them.

The indications are that the Turkish government has forced itself into a predicament, possibly even a trap, of its own making.

In this context, it is particularly disconcerting that, according to Nalbandian, the text of the Turkish-Armenian protocols was prepared entirely by the Armenian side, with Turkey suggesting only minor revisions. Why such passivity on the part of Turkish foreign ministry?

There is a perception that the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s vision of “strategic depth” and “zero problems with neighbors” is turning the country into a weakling of a country lacking resolve and respectability. 

It is also regrettable that ATAA, TCA and FTAA have lent support to the normalization process in its present form. Apparently they (at least ATAA and TCA) have chosen to toe the line with the official Turkish government policy. Living on a day-to-day basis with the realities of the Armenian propaganda perpetrated across America, these organizations should have known better. At the very least, they should have stayed neutral on the issue.

ferruh@demirmen.com

It is becoming almost an annual ritual for American presidents to issue commemorative declarations every year on April 24 to remember the Armenian “victims” of a tragic historic episode that took place almost 100 years ago. How many other foreign historic episodes nearly a century old do the American presidents commemorate every year? The answer: “zero.”

And wherein lies the secret for such homage to Armenian people? Money, my friends, and lots of it in the form of campaign contributions.

And the hapless Turks, ever watchful if the dreaded word “genocide” will be spelled out on such occasions, take a deep breath if that does not happen. They sit mostly on the sidelines, waiting for the events to unfold. Never mind that, the “g” word or no “g” word, they may be blamed for atrocities in history they did not commit.

The Turk’s attitude is the poor man’s consolation for being spared a bigger affront.

The litany

Last year, referring to “human dignity” and “epic human tragedy,” President Bush issued a statement to “honor the memory of the victims of one of the greatest tragedies of the 20th century, the mass killings and forced exile of as many as 1.5 million Armenians at the end of the Ottoman Empire.”

Not a single word about the context, and the Moslem victims.

It is a melodramatic soap opera that takes place every year, and this year it was no different.

A few days ago President Obama, referring to “man’s inhumanity to man,” called the 1915 events “one of the great atrocities of the 20th century.” He remembered the “1.5 million Armenians who were subsequently massacred or marched to their death in the final days of the Ottoman Empire.”

So, Obama didn’t use the “g” word. Big deal! But he used the equivalent term in Armenian: “Medz Yeghern,” meaning Big Calamity. To the Turks, it is nearly as offensive as the “g” word. And Obama, a smart and perceptive man, should have known.

Never believe the ANCA-type hypocrites who feigned disappointment in Obama’s choice of words because he didn’t use the “g” word. The Dashnakians must have relished Obama’s use of the term “Medz Yeghern.”

It is the first time an American president pandered to the Freudian psyche of the Armenian lobby.

The term “genocide” is a legal term, anyway, and notwithstanding the untoward motives of ANCA-swayed politicians, the UN and the International Court of Justice are the only legal entities empowered  to give credibility to that word.

A matter of balance

In all honesty, no one can blame Obama, or any other American president for that matter, to commemorate the tragic sufferings and deaths of Armenians during World War I. We must all condemn tragic events that befell humanity.

But humanity also calls for a sense of balance, or justice. Where is the context, the faithfulness to historical truth, and remembrance of Turkish and Kurdish sufferings and casualties in such condemnations?

Why is the number of Armenian casualties in these statements, which historical records show could not have exceeded half a million, boosted to 1.5 million?

Why is there no mention of the betrayal of the Ottomans by the Armenian populace, who, by forming armed gangs, attacked the Ottoman civilians and Ottoman armies from behind during wartime when the country was under Russian, French and British occupation?

More Moslems perished in the hands of terrorist Armenian gangs than the Armenians under Moslem backlash.

Do the American presidents, or politicians of all stripes for that matter, have the right to be selective in condemning “man’s inhumanity to man?”

Did the sufferings and deaths of Turks, Kurds, and even Jews in some cases, matter at all?

As Obama-the-candidate was being indoctrinated by Dashnakians as to the events during World War I and learn diligently the words “Medz Yeghern,” he should have asked his hosts to teach him how to say “betrayal”or “treason” in Armenian. And cite that word in his April 24 statement.

Those irresistible greenbacks

President Obama is a clever man with a huge popularity at home and abroad. Unlike President Bush, who had a habit of bumbling through his unscripted speeches, Obama chooses his words carefully. His language in his April 24 statement is a testimony to the irresistible effectiveness of ANCA’s lobbying efforts. His perception of history was clouded by Armenian propaganda.

The enthusiastic sponsorship that Obama received on ANCA’s website, through videos and webcasts, in apparent violation of ANCA’s tax-exempt status, is all too fresh in minds.  

Obama didn’t stop with one-sided depiction of history. Adding insult to injury, he paid homage to Americans of Armenian descent for their contributions to the American society while ignoring Turkish Americans.

Fair is fair. Does Obama think Turks are zombies of no redeemable value?

Surely, the greenbacks, lots of them, must have done wonders for the Armenian propagandists in shaping Obama’s mind.

Dubious diplomacy

Will the Turks take notice of such indignity? We don’t know. But the higher-ups in the Turkish government in Ankara probably will not. They engaged in secret negotiations in Switzerland toward normalization of relations between Ankara and Yerevan, reporting the “progress” to the Obama administration but leaving the Turkish people – as well as the Azeri people – in the dark.

Which begs the question: Did those high-flying Turkish diplomats in Switzerland think they were representing the Obama administration instead of the Turkish people?

The Azeri have a very legitimate stake in the Turkish-Armenian talks because of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.

In the meanwhile the Azeri, being briefed about the Switzerland talks by the Russians, who in turn were briefed by the Armenians, became incensed at Turks’ audacity at conducting diplomacy behind their back. The Azeri showed their displeasure by starting energy-related talks with the Russian energy giant Gazprom. Turkey’s east-west Nabucco energy transit project, already suffering from a cold bout, has become shakier still. The Azeri gas is supposed to be the initial feed gas for the project. Ankara now has its hands full trying to placate a jittery Baku.

The imponderables

Setting all this aside, President Obama perhaps deserves credit for tempering his April 24 statement with some moderation. Even Vice President Joe Biden, the inveterate genocide hawk, softened his stance. Obama could have been harsher in his statement. The moderation, of course, stems from anticipation of a growing dialog between Turkey and Armenia that started in Switzerland. Whether that will materialize, is something else. Obama didn’t want to throw cold water on the process.

But with his unmistakable pro-Armenian bias, most Turks will remain unimpressed with Obama’s stance.

The outcome of the Turkish-Armenian talks so far is a “road map” of which details are kept under wraps. Apparently there are no pre-conditions to advance talks to the next level. But the road map has many roadblocks for both sides – as well, for the Azeri.

In the meantime, the Turkish-American relations will become hostage to the outcome of diplomatic traffic between Ankara, Yerevan and Baku. With “Medz Yeghern” language in the background, it is not a reassuring thought. Turks are not comforted by Obama’s language.

Separately, there is no guarantee that a Democratically controlled U.S. House of Representatives under the leadership of Nancy Pelosi will not pass a pro-genocide resolution soon.

ferruh@demirmen.com

The recent censorship of the Darwin story in the “Science and Technology Journal,“ published by The Scientific and Technological Research Council (Tübitak) of Turkey, caused consternation in the scientific community in Turkey and beyond. Tübitak is the leading government agency established to advance science and technology in Turkey.

The censorship, first time of its kind in Tübitak’s 46-year history, was an event that would shame any respectful scientific organization.

The making of a scandal

The event started innocuously enough when the chief editor of the journal, Dr.  Çiğdem Atakuman, decided to commemorate Charles Darwin’s 200^th birthday by running a 16-page cover story on the scientist’s life and his theory of evolution in its March edition. Unesco, the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, had declared 2009 as the Year of Darwin.

By established protocol in Tübitak, Atakuman had the authority to decide on the contents of the journal. But when Prof. Dr. Ömer Cebeci, a vice-president and member of the governing Science Board, found out about the Darwin article while it was at the press, the article and the photograph of Darwin on the cover page were peremptorily removed.

A revised March edition, missing 16 pages and one week late, was issued, and Atakuman was verbally fired from her editorial position (“re-assigned”). The cover page was replaced with one dealing with global climate change.

What Tübitak did not realize was that its actions were a recipe for a scandal.

Condemnation

The reaction from various quarters in Turkey and abroad was swift. Academics and students from various universities in Turkey gathered in front of the Tübitak building in Ankara to protest the censorship. Amid calls for the resignation of the Science Board, other academics, journalists, nongovernmental organizations and opposition politicians condemned Tübitak’s action. Turkish media gave wide coverage to the incident, and newspapers abroad weighed in.

Tübitak was caught in a storm it had not expected.

Voices of concern came from the Royal Society in London, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), EU politicians, and other foreign sources. Bloggers wasted no time on the Internet to chime in.

Science versus dogma

What lay at the core of these criticisms, and rightly so, was that science was being subjugated to the dictates of religious dogma. Darwin’s theory of evolution, while it forms one of the building stones of modern science, is incompatible with Islamic faith that man was created by God.

Data suggest that only 25 percent of Turks believe in evolution, some, including the education minister Hüseyin Çelik, associating it with atheism. Turkish theologians generally reject the idea that man evolved from lower beings.

There is, of course, a similar quandary with the Christian and Jewish faiths, but in the Turkish case Islamic teachings never stood in the way of evolutionary science. The academics and scientists managed to separate or reconcile evolution and Islamic faith, and the government did not interfere. They were free to practice and teach science including the theory of evolution.

That was in keeping with the secular fabric of the republic as established by Kemal Atatürk.

Tübitak itself featured Darwin many times in its journal in the past, and the event passed without any incident.

Islamic wind

The changeover in Tübitak’s stance on science, in particular the theory of evolution, is no accident. After the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in November 2002, the government has undertaken a relentless campaign to undermine secular education in Turkey. Elements of Islam have been injected into the educational system in various degrees, and religious schools have been promoted. Evolution has been relegated to second status in favor of creationism.

The government has implemented its Islamic policy through laws, regulations and partisan appointments (in some cases in “acting capacity’). The result is a highly politicized educational system from bottom up, including the Council of Higher Education (YÖK).

The shift in Tübitak is part of this politicization process. Beginning in January 2004, when the current president of the Science Board, Prof. Dr. Nüket Yetiş, was appointed in acting capacity, most members in senior administration resigned or were forced out. Amendments made to Tübitak’s charter in August 2008 gave the government substantial control over the institution.

Also in August 2008 Yetiş, whose appointment had previously been vetoed by President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, was appointed as the president of Tübitak by President Abdullah Gül. Yetiş reportedly has ties to Islamists.

Of the 12 members of the Science Board, 10 received their appointments during the AKP government.

So, at the core of the Darwin scandal was political pressure coming from the AKP.

Damage control

To remedy the embarrassment, Tübitak issued a statement denying censorship of the Darwin article and attributing the incident to “miscommunication.” It said there would be a special issue of the magazine later in 2009 covering Darwin.

A press release issued by Atakuman in reply, giving a detailed account of the events, however, left no doubt that censorship had taken place. Atakuman noted that after the incident she was reprimanded by Cebeci, her boss, in his office for pursuing a “provocative” subject in a “sensitive environment” – meaning the AKP rule.

Tübitak would be hard put to explain why the Darwin article was provocative.

Stung by criticism, the government, despite its well-known opposition to evolution, claimed it had played no role in the incident. Surprisingly – and perhaps not surprisingly – YÖK, the council overseeing higher education, declined to comment.

More fallout

What is most disconcerting about the Darwin incident is that it may stunt independent thinking and hinder science in Turkey. Science can only advance if it is free of ideology and religious dogma. Darwin’s theory of evolution is an integral part of science, and it must be disseminated, argued and researched without outside interference. Tübitak should promote, not hinder, such efforts.

It is no surprise that Prof. Dr. Tahsin Yeşildere, Head of the Association for University Lecturers, commented that “Turkish science is in the hands of anachronistic brains who hold it in contempt,” while Lord Martin Rees, president of the Royal Society, called the Darwin incident an example of “cultural corruption and . . . intellectual dishonesty.”

Nor is it a surprise that some EU politicians expressed disquiet, pointing out that the incident was a blatant violation of freedom of thought and scientific independence. Le Monde commented that Islamic groups in Turkey were waging war against Darwin.

Turkey’s prospect to join the EU, already shaky, will no doubt be affected.

What is also ironic, and disturbing, is that the Darwin censorship has taken place in a country that had benefited from Atatürk’s vision. Atatürk observed, eloquently, that “Science is the true guide in life.”

A disquieting thought

It has been 84 years since America had its bizarre “Scopes Trial” (“Monkey Trial“) in a Tennessee court. The trial was portrayed by some as a titanic struggle between good and evil, when in fact it was about truth and ignorance, or about light and dark.

Is it possible that Turkey may soon have its own “Scopes Trial”? That would be most unfortunate. But if the AKP, with its Islamic agenda, continues to meddle with science, it may come to that.

ferruh@demirmen.com